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Introduction 
Debates over prenatal testing, disability, and public education are at 
the very center of my everyday work as an attorney. My legal practice 
focuses on representing children and families in complex special education 
and adoption law matters. Many of the children I represent are affected 
by genetic syndromes, chromosomal abnormalities, spina bifida and other 
neural tube defects, or disabilities caused by pregnancy, birth, and 
neonatal complications. I also advise several educational, medical, and 
social service organizations. This work involves counseling medical 
geneticists and genetic counselors who provide prenatal genetic testing 
services and develop new genetic technologies.  
Through these experiences, I am uniquely able to observe and  
participate in the debates over the ethical and legal parameters that 
govern women’s choices about prenatal testing and the responsibilities 
of individual families and society in caring for the wellbeing of children 
with disabilities. This Article considers the experiences of families with 
children affected by genetic conditions and the issues raised by  
prenatal genetic testing technologies. It raises questions about the 
appropriateness of state involvement in the choices women make about 
prenatal testing, particularly under the Prenatally and Postnatally 
Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act of 2008.1  
Paradoxically, those political and social actors that most often seek 
to involve the state in reproductive choice also support the privatization 
of responsibility for the care and education of children with disabilities. 
As a result, the privacy right relating to intimate relationships, the 
family, and decisions about whether to have a child is becoming less 
absolute. I argue that this is not accidental, as the expansion of public 
surveillance and regulation of women’s reproductive decisions and the 
related demonizing of the exercise of reproductive choice has diverted 
attention from efforts to provide for the social welfare by developing the 
necessary response of a just society. Such a response should involve:  
(1) the promulgation of rational regulations governing the development, 
access, and use of existing and emerging prenatal genetic screening and 
diagnostic technologies; and (2) the development of policies that give all 
children, including ones affected by genetic disorders, access to meaning-
ful educational opportunities and health care. 
Part I of this Article frames the discussion surrounding recent public 
controversies about prenatal testing, public education, and choice. It 
explores the choices that some of my clients have made about prenatal 
genetic testing and considers their experiences in the context of recent 
political discourse. Part II provides a brief overview of prenatal testing 
 
1. Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act,  
Pub. L. No. 110-374, 122 Stat. 4501 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201, 280g-8). 
Health Matrix·Volume 23·Issue 1·2013 
What Does Choice Really Mean? 
57 
and the choices pregnant women must make in light of emerging 
prenatal genetic testing technologies. Part III discusses the legal, social, 
and bioethical implications of prenatal testing and disability. Part IV 
discusses efforts to address these issues through legislation and the use of 
public policy to shape the choices resulting from the use of prenatal 
genetic testing. Finally, Part V examines questions related to the current 
efforts to constrict reproductive choices involving genetic testing while 
simultaneously privatizing responsibility for disability. This section 
considers some of the challenges that arise from not just being pregnant 
and giving birth but actually parenting children with disabilities. For 
parents of children with disabilities, educational issues are often a 
primary concern, and the public school system is the government 
institution that usually helps define parental choices and responsibilities. 
My examination focuses on the effects of increased privatization of 
public special education programs and services. I emphasize the contra-
dictions created by public policies intended to constrict the exercise of 
reasonable reproductive choices while claiming that the need to foster 
parental choice justifies the neo-liberal state’s transfer of educational 
services for children with disabilities to the private realms of family and 
market.2  
I. Recent Controversies: Presidential Politics, 
Amniocentesis, and Public Education 
Professor Harold Pollack notes that “[s]ixty years ago, the birth of 
an intellectually disabled child was viewed as a private tragedy. Families 
did the best they could, for as long as they could, or turned to forbid-
ding public institutions for help.”3 The full inclusion and equality of 
people with disabilities in American society is far from being achieved, 
but a return to the secrecy, shame, and stigma that had surrounded 
families with disabled children will likely never occur. Unlike the women 
of sixty years ago, my clients do not view their children as private 
tragedies; rather, they proudly advocate for them and openly share their 
experiences. Clients have shared stories with me about their experiences 
with prenatal testing and how it has affected parenting a child with 
disabilities. These stories reveal what influences women’s choices 
whether to undergo prenatal testing and how they use the information 
that testing reveals to make decisions about their pregnancies. These 
 
2. Cf. Dorothy E. Roberts, Privatization and Punishment in the New Age of 
Reprogenetics, 54 EMORY L.J. 1343, 1345 (2005) (“Rather than expand 
public surveillance and regulation of women’s reproductive decisions, we 
should tackle the social conditions that limit women’s options for bearing 
and raising healthy children who can flourish in this society.”).  
3. Harold A. Pollack, Do Liberals Disdain the Disabled?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/27/opinion/do-liberals-
disdain-the-disabled.html. 
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stories provide insights into the complex and often transformative 
experience of raising children with disabilities. 
I have observed that women’s ethnic backgrounds, religious beliefs, 
language barriers, and education levels can influence their decisions 
about prenatal testing. These factors, however, are not predictive or 
uniform across cultural or ethnic groups.4 Some of the women I represent 
have refused prenatal testing for religious or cultural reasons. Yet other 
women with religious and personal objections to abortion have under-
gone prenatal testing—not with the intent to terminate an affected 
pregnancy, but rather to prepare for the birth and share the diagnosis 
with family, friends, and health professionals. I have also represented 
families of children who had been diagnosed prenatally with spina bifida 
and undergone fetal surgery. Although these children still demonstrate 
disabilities, their medical and education records indicate that prenatal 
diagnosis and surgery likely lessened the severity of their conditions.  
Some of the women I have represented underwent prenatal testing 
because of advanced maternal age and, after learning the fetus had a 
chromosomal abnormality, chose to continue the pregnancy. These 
women decided that the challenges associated with the diagnosis neither 
precluded a good quality of life nor detracted from the potential satisfac-
tion of having a child. Other women have been very open in admitting 
that they did not wish to have a child with a disability. These women 
underwent prenatal testing and were told that the fetus had normal 
chromosomes. However, after demonstrating unusual health issues as 
newborns and subsequent developmental delays, these children were 
diagnosed with rare genetic disorders that are not tested for unless there 
is a known family history. Some of these mothers have since had other 
children after learning about the possibility of preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis or prenatal diagnosis for these rare disorders. These women 
wanted reassurance before undertaking another pregnancy and the 
opportunity to act on the information if the fetus was similarly affected. 
Other clients, concerned about the parenting challenges they already 
face, have elected not to have more children despite the availability of 
prenatal testing or knowledge that the likelihood of another affected 
pregnancy is statistically small.5 
Many women who underwent prenatal diagnosis and chose to con-
tinue an affected pregnancy have shared with me that during their 
pregnancy and the child’s infancy they felt that they exercised independ-
ent judgment and made conscious choices despite pressure from partners 
 
4. Eugene Pergament & Deborah Pergament, Reproductive Decisions After 
Fetal Genetic Counseling, BEST PRACTICE & RESEARCH CLINICAL 
OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 1, 13 (2012).  
5. See Maryhelen D. MacInnes, One’s Enough for Now: Children, Disability, 
and the Subsequent Childbearing of Mothers, 70 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 758, 
758 (2008). 
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or family.6 Ultimately, these women relied on their own personal values 
and the information they received from health care professionals. They 
reported that the physicians and genetic counselors they consulted were 
knowledgeable and helpful.7 
The women who learned about their child’s disability during the 
prenatal period have felt sadness and loss about the diagnosis and 
experienced doubts about their choices. All profess love for their children 
and value their children’s place in their family life,8 but many remain 
affected by the difficulties of constantly focusing on their child’s health. 
Before the births of their children, several of my clients had significant 
experiences with disability: some had siblings with disabilities or worked 
as teachers, therapists, and physicians with children with disabilities. 
However, even these women were not fully aware of the sense of urgency, 
the responsibilities, and the economic and emotional demands involved 
in parenting a child with disabilities. They were surprised by the lack of 
support they received from the very institutions required to assist their 
children.9 This is the reason they come to my offices. Regardless of how 
they became a parent of a child with a disability, my clients believe they 
are “fighting for their child’s educational needs to be met by institutions 
that are underfunded and often ill-equipped to do the job.”10 They often 
feel that the public school system not only fails to support their choices 
 
6. See Pergament & Pergament, supra note 4 (reporting that women making 
decisions about prenatal testing face pressures from others, emotions, and a 
lack of information). 
7. This is different from what has been reported in the medical literature. 
See, e.g., Brian G. Skotko, Prenatally Diagnosed Down Syndrome: Mothers 
Who Continued Their Pregnancies Evaluate Their Health Care Providers, 
192 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 670, 671-72 (2005). The differences 
in this admittedly unscientific and much smaller sample may result from 
the fact the families I represent have access to medical geneticists and 
genetic counselors affiliated with academic medical centers. Most have 
received comprehensive genetic counseling during pregnancy and all have 
received genetic services after the birth and postnatal confirmation of 
diagnoses. My clients also tend to demonstrate the self-advocacy skills 
necessary to request information and attention from healthcare providers. 
8. See, e.g., Sara Eleanor Green, “We’re Tired, not Sad”: Benefits and 
Burdens of Mothering a Child with a Disability, 64 SOCIAL SCIENCE & MED. 
150 (2007)  
9. See, e.g., Marsha Mailick Seltzer et al., Psychosocial and Biological 
Markers of Daily Lives of Midlife Parents of Children with Disabilities, 50 
J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 1, 2 (2009) (“Parents of children with disabilities 
face a range of stressors associated with their children’s behavior problems, 
including stigma, cost of care, and having to negotiate a fragmented service 
system . . . .”).  
10. See Margaret Storey, “Special Needs,” McCain-Palin, & the 2008 Election, 
SALON (Sept. 21, 2008, 3:25 PM), 
http://open.salon.com/blog/margaret_storey/2008/09/19/special_needs_
mccain-palinthe_2008_election. 
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regarding their child but has even become a source of worry, concern, 
and growing resentment.  
On February 19, 2012, these issues became the latest front in the 
decades-long cultural war over abortion and a woman’s right to repro-
ductive choice, autonomy, and privacy. During an interview on CBS’s 
Face the Nation, then presidential candidate Rick Santorum was asked 
about his comments during campaign stops and media appearances that 
the Affordable Care Act is designed to increase abortions and reduce 
overall health costs by culling the ranks of the disabled.11 Santorum 
argued that insurance companies should not be required to pay for 
prenatal testing, claiming that amniocentesis “more often than not” 
results in abortion.12 This sweeping overgeneralization may have been 
made as a provocative sound bite, but it is still worth considering in 
discussing the broader issues regarding the meaning of choice and 
prenatal testing.13 While Santorum indicated that he is not opposed to 
“general prenatal care,” he sees prenatal genetic testing solely as a 
conduit to abortion14 and completely ignores the contribution it makes to 
obstetrical care.15 He failed to acknowledge the role testing plays in 
reassuring expectant mothers and their partners about the health of the 
 
11. Face the Nation (CBS television broadcast Feb. 19, 2012), transcript 
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/2102-3460_162-57381060.html. 
12. Id.  
13. Santorum failed to consider the basic medical fact that most fetuses are 
not affected by Down syndrome or diagnosed with another trisomy, even 
among the population that has undergone chromosomal analysis after 
amniocentesis. See Antonio Forabosco et al.,, Incidence of Non-Age-
Dependent Chromosomal Abnormalities: A Population Based Study on 
88965 Amniocenteses, 17 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 897 (2009). The second, 
more complex, issue relates to the inflated description of the rate of 
abortions after the detection of Down syndrome by amniocentesis. 
Santorum claimed that “ninety percent of Down syndrome children in 
America are aborted.” Face the Nation, supra note 11. This assertion is not 
supported in the scientific literature. See generally Jaime L. Natoli et al., 
Prenatal Diagnosis of Down Syndrome: A Systematic Review of 
Termination Rates (1995-2011), 32 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 142 (2012). The 
review determined that weighted mean termination rate was 67 percent 
among seven population-based studies, 85 percent among nine hospital-
based studies, and 50 percent among eight anomaly-based studies. 
Evidence suggests that termination rates have decreased in recent years. 
Termination rates also vary with maternal age, gestational age, and 
maternal race/ethnicity. The study concluded that a summary termination 
rate may not be applicable to the entire US population.  Id. 
14. Face the Nation, supra note 11.  
15. See Eugene Pergament, Prenatal Testing: Screening, Diagnosis, and 
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, in MOLECULAR GENETICS AND 
PERSONALIZED MEDICINE 147, 147 (D. Hunter Best & Jeffrey J. Swensen 
eds., 2012). 
Health Matrix·Volume 23·Issue 1·2013 
What Does Choice Really Mean? 
61 
fetus, the avoidance of pregnancy complications,16 facilitating interven-
tions like fetal surgery,17 and helping families to prepare for the birth of 
a child with a disability. 
Santorum was also asked about his statements against the involve-
ment of state and federal governments in public education.18 His 
comments demonstrated firm support for the privatization of public 
education. He spoke of choice in public education, including the option 
to have localities choose to place students in private or Christian 
schools.19 He advocated removing all federal mandates on education, 
which, although not explicitly mentioned, would include requirements to 
address the educational needs of children with disabilities.20 Although 
likely unintended by the candidate, Santorum’s campaign provides a 
starting point to consider the right to make choices regarding prenatal 
testing, disability, education, and the wider meaning of a political 
philosophy built upon inherent contradictions about parental rights to 
make choices regarding children with disabilities.  
Santorum was not the first to employ this political strategy and to 
invoke a child with a disability. It was a more charged and strident 
recast of Sarah Palin’s occasionally poignant—but still highly partisan—
effort in 2008 to depict herself as the potential advocate in the White 
House for families of children with disabilities.21 Her one substantive 
policy speech was about special education and contained numerous 
references to her son with Down syndrome.22 Palin, who delivered her 
son at forty-four years old, openly acknowledged having an amniocen-
 
16. Letter from James N. Martin, President, Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists, to the 2012 Declared Presidential Candidates (Feb. 21, 
2012) (providing information concerning the importance of prenatal care, 
including identification of fetal problems and early indicators of premature 
birth).  
17. Emily A. Partridge & Alan W. Flake, Maternal-Fetal Surgery for 
Structural Malformations, 26 BEST PRACTICE & RESEARCH CLINICAL 
OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 669, 679 (2012) (concluding that advances in 
prenatal diagnosis and technical innovations in the surgical approach to 
the fetus have resulted in an increase in the successful clinical application 
of fetal intervention over the past three decades). 
18. Face the Nation, supra note 11.  
19. Id. 
20. See Trip Gabriel, Santorum Defends Remarks on Obama and 
Government’s Role in Education, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2012, at A11.  
21. Julie Bosman, In Palin, Families of Disabled Children See a Potential 
White House Friend, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2008, at A19. 
22. See Sarah Palin, Palin’s Speech on Children with Special Needs, REAL 
CLEAR POLITICS (Oct. 24, 2008), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/ 
articles/2008/10/palins_speech_on_children_with.html. 
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tesis.23 This admission is a noteworthy difference in the two candidates’ 
discussions of their children with genetic disorders, issues related to 
children with disabilities, and how they discussed prenatal testing.24 
While Santorum expressed almost unqualified disdain for prenatal 
testing, Palin stepped outside the expected pro-life framework. She 
expressed thankfulness for the availability of amniocentesis and the 
chance the procedure gave her to prepare for her son’s birth.25 Given her 
avowed pro-life position, her admission that she struggled with the 
information and how to share it with her family reflected both unusual 
candor and a departure from current conservative tenets on reproductive 
choice issues.26 Other than these personal revelations, however, she 
largely sidestepped the issue of prenatal testing throughout the remain-
der of the campaign.  
Palin spoke gratefully about her strong family network and alluded 
to her ability to access resources while acknowledging others not as 
fortunate.27 But unlike her discussion of her experiences with amniocen-
tesis, Palin did not step outside the expected conservative framework 
regarding education reform and parental responsibility.28 According to 
Palin, problems will be solved by transferring more activities to the 
private sector and requiring families to assume more responsibility under 
the guise of giving them more choices and control over their children’s 
educational placements.29 
 
23. Jodi Kantor et al., Fusing Politics and Motherhood in a New Way, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2008, at A1. 
24. The question of whether the difference between Rick Santorum’s and Sarah 
Palin’s public comments on prenatal testing reflect gender differences, bona 
fide political beliefs, or carefully constructed policy positions is beyond the 
scope of this Article and will likely be the subject of academic and popular 
media considerations of both figures for some time. 
25. Sandra Sobieraj Westfall, John McCain & Sarah Palin on Shattering the 
Glass Ceiling, PEOPLE (Aug. 29, 2008, 8:30 PM), 
http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,20222685,00.html. 
26. See, e.g., The Politics of Amniocentesis, FREAKONOMICS (Sept. 11, 2008, 
11:12 AM), http://www.freakonomics.com/2008/9/11/the-politics-of-
amniocentesis. 
27. See Palin, supra note 22 (“The law requires our public schools to serve 
children with special needs, but often the results fall far short of the service 
they need. Even worse, parents are left with no other options, except for 
the few families that can afford private instruction or therapy.”). 
28. Id.; see generally Mark Harrison, Public Problems, Private Solutions: 
School Choice and Its Consequences, 25 CATO J. 197 (2005) (providing an 
overview of the market approach to organizing elementary and secondary 
education systems). 
29. See Rayna Rapp & Faye Ginsburg, Reverberations: Disability and the New 
Kinship Imaginary, 84 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 379, 397-98 (2011). 
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While preparing to participate in this Symposium, I considered  
Santorum’s and Palin’s comments regarding both prenatal testing and 
public schools in light of my own experiences representing clients 
involved in both issues. My mind turned to the term “New Challenges” 
in the program’s title and the English language formulation of Jean-
Baptiste Alphonse Karr’s famous epigram, “the more things change, the 
more they stay the same.”30 Prenatal genetic technologies may be rapidly 
expanding, but access to both abortion and to public services for 
children with disabilities is contracting. For the last half-century, we 
have remained mired in questions about what rights women have to use 
these technologies and how to balance private and public responsibilities 
for children with disabilities. The current political and social climate has 
forced us to return to questions regarding (1) what level of control the 
state or any other third party should be allowed over the individual 
right to exercise rational choice in the utilization of prenatal genetic 
testing technologies and (2) the responsibilities of a just society regard-
ing the care and education of children with disabilities.31 
II. A Brief Overview of the Past and the Current 
Status of Prenatal Genetic Testing 
A. Prenatal Genetic Testing 
Over the past half-century, a remarkable evolution has occurred in 
the development of screening and diagnostic testing for genetic and other 
disorders seen in the prenatal period.32 Prenatal testing has become an 
integral part of routine obstetrical care and management of prospective 
 
30. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 627 (Emily M. Beck ed., 14th ed. 
1968) (quoting ALPHONSE KARR, 4 LES GUÊPES 407 (1849) (“Plus ça 
change, plus c’est la même chose.”)). 
31. My formulation of these questions was influenced by Baroness Helena 
Kennedy’s description of the role of the state in the foreword to the report 
of the Human Genetics Commission. HUMAN GENETICS COMMISSION, 
MAKING BABIES: REPRODUCTIVE DECISIONS AND GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES 5 
(2006). It must be acknowledged that the Human Genetics Commission’s 
recommendations are made in a context that recognizes the challenge these 
issues create for the welfare state, which is a distinctly different approach 
than the market oriented approach that is the dominant paradigm in the 
United States. “In the UK, reproductive choices are made against the 
background of the welfare state. In this sense, founding a family is not a 
purely personal issue, but can have a wider social impact. This is because 
some fertility treatment is subsidized by state, and services are provided 
for babies and children who may have higher than average care needs, 
because of their health and/or family circumstances. However, at this time 
such considerations have by and large not been taken into account by 
individuals or expressly addressed by the state.” Id. at 20.  
32. Pergament, supra note 15, at 147. 
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parents.33 Reproductive genetic testing and screening methods currently 
used in the clinical setting include prenatal genetic screening, prenatal 
genetic diagnosis utilizing invasive procedures (e.g., chorionic villus 
sampling and amniocentesis),34 and preimplantation genetic diagnosis 
(PGD).35 Although popular images of prenatal testing and recent 
political discourse have focused on invasive procedures (notably amnio-
centesis), most pregnant women undergoing prenatal testing are now less 
likely to undergo invasive procedures.  
Prenatal screening determines a woman’s risk for a chromosomal  
bnormality by statistically analyzing maternal serum and ultrasound 
markers. The primary purpose of screening is to determine whether an 
invasive procedure to obtain fetal genetic material for diagnostic purposes 
is warranted.36 Prenatal genetic testing has very recently expanded to 
include noninvasive prenatal testing37 for the identification of trisomy 21 
(Down syndrome), trisomy 18 (Edward syndrome), and trisomy 13 (Patau 
Syndrome) as well as for the detection of X and Y chromosomes.  
 
33. Id.  
34. Amniocentesis relies on the chromosomal and biochemical analysis of 
cultured amniotic fluid. It can be performed after a gestational age of 
fourteen weeks and is usually performed between fifteen and seventeen 
weeks. Ronald J. Wapner, Genetic Amniocentesis and Chorionic Villus 
Sampling, in QUEENAN’S MANAGEMENT OF HIGH-RISK PREGNANCY: AN 
EVIDENCE-BASED APPROACH 453 (John T. Queenan et al. eds., 6th ed. 
2012). Chorionic villus sampling (CVS) is also an invasive procedure to 
obtain material that reflects the genotype of the conceptus. Id. The 
procedure is typically performed between seventy and eighty-one days after 
the last menstrual period and involves the withdrawal of villi of the 
chorion (part of the placenta) under ultrasound guidance. Id.  
35. “[PGD] is an alternative to prenatal diagnosis for the detection of genetic 
disorders in [genetic parents] at risk of transmitting a genetic condition to 
their offspring.” See Pergament, supra note 15, at 157. It requires the use 
of three integrated technologies: conventional (IVF), micromanipulation of 
single cells, and genetic analysis of the single cell. Id. at 157. It is still 
subject to confirmation by invasive testing. Id. at 160. Although PGD 
raises many ethical, legal, and social issues, the limited clinical use of this 
technology is reflected in the limited discussion of PGD and the emphasis 
on other forms of prenatal testing in this Article. 
36. Id. at 153 (stating that the application of first and second trimester 
screening has led to corresponding reduction in the rates of invasive testing 
by CVS and amniocentesis). 
37. Current literature often refers to noninvasive prenatal testing (NIPT) as 
noninvasive prenatal diagnosis (NPID). This terminology is considered by 
many as inaccurate and misleading because the current technology is 
recommended only as a highly specific screening measure for high-risk 
pregnancies that requires follow-up diagnostic testing. Patricia L. Devers et 
al., Noninvasive Prenatal Testing/Noninvasive Prenatal Diagnosis: The 
Position of the National Society of Genetic Counselors, J. GENETIC 
COUNSELORS, Jan. 22, 2013, http://www.nsgc.org/Portals/0/Advocacy/ 
nsgc%20nipt%20white%20Paper.pdf. 
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Although currently not considered diagnostic for any disorder, noninvasive 
testing will likely evolve into a fully diagnostic process for the entire fetal 
genome.38  
In 2007, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
(ACOG) issued Practice Bulletins recommending that prenatal screening 
using ultrasound, serum makers, and invasive prenatal testing be offered 
to all pregnant women, regardless of age.39 The guidelines recommend 
that both first- and second-trimester screening be offered to women who 
seek prenatal care in the first trimester.40 Most importantly, “maternal 
age of 35 years alone should no longer be used as a threshold to deter-
mine who is offered screening versus who is offered invasive testing.”41 
Adding to the challenges of how to counsel all pregnant women about 
prenatal testing is the broadening range of inherited disorders that 
carrier screening can identify in parents and during the prenatal period 
as well as the introduction of noninvasive prenatal testing.42  
B. Prenatal Screening 
To understand prenatal testing technologies, it is important to draw 
a distinction between prenatal screening and diagnosis. “A screening test 
either determines whether prospective parents are carriers of mutations 
(e.g., cystic fibrosis) or whether a pregnancy is at increased risk for a 
specific disorder (e.g., a chromosomal abnormality such as trisomy 
21).”43  
Before 1970, reproductive risk assessment was largely based on  
family history, patterns of inheritance of known Mendelian diseases, and 
limited information about the prevalence of genetic, developmental, and 
other disorders in newborns.44 During the 1970s, mid-trimester amniocen-
tesis made actual prenatal diagnosis of some genetic disorders possible.45 
In the early 1980s, physicians began to use genetic screening of maternal 
 
38. INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY OF PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS, ISPD RAPID RESPONSE 
STATEMENT: PRENATAL DETECTION OF DOWN SYNDROME USING MASSIVELY 
PARALLEL SEQUENCING (MPS) (2011). 
39. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, ACOG Practice 
Bulletin No. 77: Screening for Fetal Chromosomal Abnormalities, 109 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 217, 219 (2007); see also American College of 
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, ACOG Practice Bulletin No. 88: Invasive 
Prenatal Testing for Aneuploidy, 110 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1459, 
1462 (2007). 
40. ACOG Practice Bulletin No. 77, supra note 39. 
41. ACOG Practice Bulletin No. 88, supra note 39, at 1462. 
42. Pergament, supra note 15, at 150. 
43. Id. at 147 (defining the difference between genetic screening and testing). 
44. Pergament & Pergament, supra note 4. 
45. Id.  
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serum alpha fetoprotein widely in clinical practice.46 The use of this type 
of screening in the second trimester for all pregnant women became 
possible with the development of statistical analyses that discriminated 
more accurately between affected and unaffected pregnancies.47 By the 
end of the 1980s, the use of maternal serum biochemistry and detailed 
ultrasonographic examination in the second trimester became the 
standard of care.48  
In the early 1990s, clinicians in London started performing first  
trimester screening for trisomy 21 and other aneuploidies utilizing 
measurements of nuchal translucency (the amount of fluid behind the 
neck of the fetus) via ultrasound during the first trimester.49 The 
accuracy of this screening technique has since been enhanced by using a 
likelihood ratio analysis based on maternal age, nuchal translucency 
thickness, and measurements of maternal serum proteins free-beta hCG 
(human chorionic gondatropin) and PAPP-A (pregnancy-associated 
plasma protein).50 These techniques were adopted into clinical use in the 
United States in the late 1990s.51 Screening by this combined test can 
identify about 90 percent of fetuses with trisomy 21 and other major 
aneuploidies with a false-positive rate of 5 percent.52 This approach has 
been further refined with the use of fetal nasal bone measurements53 and 
screening for cardiac abnormalities.54  
Prenatal screening using ultrasound and maternal markers has  
altered the rate of invasive prenatal diagnosis. This is particularly 
apparent in the population of women over thirty-five years of age as 
increasing numbers of these women rely on the individually adjusted risk 
 
46. Pergament, supra note 15, at 151.  
47. Id. 
48. See id. at 152. 
49. Kypros H. Nicolaides et al., Fetal Nuchal Translucency: Ultrasound 
Screening for Chromosomal Defects in First Trimester of Pregnancy, 304 
BRIT. MED. J. 867, 867 (1992) (examining the significance of fetal nuchal 
translucency at 10-14 weeks’ gestation in the prediction of abnormal fetal 
karyotype). 
50. Pergament, supra note 15, at 152. 
51. Id.  
52. Id. 
53. Simona Cicero et al., Maternal Serum Biochemistry at 11-13 (+6) Weeks 
in Relation to the Presence or Absence of the Fetal Nasal Bone on 
Ultrasonography in Chromosomally Abnormal Fetuses: An Updated 
Analysis of Integrated Ultrasound and Biochemical Screening,  
25 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 977, 977 (2005). 
54. Kypros H. Nicolaides, Nuchal Translucency and Other First-Trimester 
Sonographic Markers of Chromosomal Abnormalities, 191 AM. J. 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 45, 57 (2004). 
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figure for Down syndrome to make a decision about invasive testing.55 
The use of these screening tests has lowered the gestational age of 
prenatal diagnosis and potential abortion.56 Increased use of first  
trimester screening has also affected pregnancy management and 
outcome.57 Certain biophysical markers (maternal weight, height, ethnic 
background, age, and obstetrical history) and certain biochemical 
markers are associated with preeclampsia, gestational diabetes mellitus, 
small-for-gestational-age fetuses, and preterm delivery.58 Identification of 
these risk factors is increasingly being used to structure prenatal care to 
avoid pregnancy complications associated with delivering newborns at 
significantly increased risk for lifelong disabilities.59 
C. Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis and Array-Based Comparative Genome 
Hybridization 
A screening test is neither a definitive test nor a diagnostic test.60 
The information obtained from screening tests is typically used to aid in 
a decision whether to proceed with diagnostic testing.61 Diagnostic 
testing involves chorionic villus sampling (CVS) or amniocentesis.62 Two 
innovations are changing the practice of prenatal testing: array-based 
comparative genome hybridization (aCGH)63 and noninvasive prenatal 
testing.64  
Array-based comparative genome hybridization is one of several  
recent developments in laboratory analysis for chromosomal and single-
gene abnormalities found in samples obtained from amniocentesis or 
 
55. Pergament, supra note 15, at 153.  
56. Allan S. Nadel & Marisa L. Likhite, Impact of First-Trimester Aneuploidy 
Screening in a High-Risk Population, 26 FETAL DIAGNOSIS & THERAPY 29, 
29 (2009).  
57. Kypros H. Nicolaides, Turning the Pyramid of Prenatal Care, 29 FETAL 
DIAGNOSIS & THERAPY 183, 183 (2011) (proposing that the traditional 
pyramid of care should be inverted, with the main emphasis placed in the 
first rather than third trimester of pregnancy); see also Joseph R. Wax et 
al., Biophysical and Biochemical Screening for the Risk of Preterm Labor, 
30 PRENATAL SCREENING & DIAGNOSIS 693 (2010). 
58. Nicolaides, supra note 57, at 183.  
59. Id. 
60. Pergament & Pergament, supra note 44. 
61. See generally Pergament, supra note 15, at 151-52. 
62. Joe Leigh Simpson, Invasive Procedures for Prenatal Diagnosis: Any 
Future Left?, 26 BEST PRACTICE & RESEARCH CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & 
GYNAECOLOGY 625, 625 (2012).  
63. Id. at 626.  
64. ISPD RAPID RESPONSE, supra note 38 (discussing the commercial 
availability of non-invasive tests based on the presence of cell-free fetal 
nucleic acids in paternal plasma in the United States, China, and Europe). 
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CVS. Although conventional chromosome analysis remains the “gold 
standard,” it is not capable of identifying the submicroscopic deletions or 
duplications of DNA from chromosomes that are often associated with 
congenital malformations and significant developmental disabilities.65 
These can be identified by aCGH.66 The method has already been 
established for fast and accurate detection of chromosome abnormalities 
in the postnatal period, allowing for diagnosis of syndromes and better 
clinical management of children who are demonstrating developmental 
delays and have normal chromosome analysis using conventional  
karyotyping.67  
While aCGH permits fast and accurate detection of chromosome  
abnormalities in the postnatal period, its use in the prenatal setting 
poses several clinical and ethical challenges.68 First, because aCGH 
increases the statistical likelihood of identification of clinically significant 
variations, it results in more women being told that a fetus has some 
type of chromosomal abnormality.69 Second, standards have not yet been 
established for whether the aCGH platform should be applied using 
target arrays or genome-wide arrays.70 While target arrays focus on 
specific genomic disorders, genome-wide arrays allow for the potential 
detection of every known genetic disorder.71 The higher resolution of 
aCGH analysis can also identify chromosomal variations that are either 
benign or of uncertain clinical significance.72  
Medical geneticists, genetics counselors, and their legal and ethics 
advisors are currently struggling to develop practice policies and  
informed consent procedures to address the challenges resulting from 
using this technology in prenatal diagnosis.73 Clinicians must help 
patients make decisions based on a chromosomal analysis that is signifi-
cantly more sensitive than was available with previous methods of 
prenatal testing.74 This sensitivity requires patients to confront choices 
 
65. Pergament, supra note 15, at 154-55. 
66. Id. at 154.  
67. Id. at 154-55; see generally S. Hussain Askree & Madhuri R. Hegde, Array 
Comparative Genomic Hybridization in Cytogenetics and Molecular 
Genetics, in MOLECULAR GENETICS & PERSONALIZED MEDICINE 21, 27-28, 
(D. Hunter Best & Jeffrey J. Swensen eds., 2012). 
68. See Andrew Pollack, Clinical Trial is Favorable for a Prenatal Test, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2012, at B1. 
69. Pergament, supra note 15, at 155. 
70. Id. 
71. Id.  
72. Id.  
73. See id. at 159. 
74. The sensitivity of aCGH is also presenting other unique psychosocial 
challenges as the technology allows the routine use of chromosome analysis 
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about pregnancies demonstrating chromosomal variations that are 
anomalous but uncertain to cause developmental or other disabilities.75 
This information further complicates the choices women must make 
about prenatal testing, forcing them to decide how much information 
they wish to learn and what to do when an analysis reveals uncertain 
information. 
D. Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing 
For the last two decades, the risk of miscarriage associated with  
invasive procedures, even when performed by the most skilled and 
experienced physicians under state-of-the-art ultrasound guidance, has 
fueled research into noninvasive prenatal diagnostic techniques.76 Until 
recently, clinicians and researchers considered the development of 
reliable non-invasive prenatal methods as the “holy grail” of clinical 
prenatal genetics.77 The clinical availability of noninvasive prenatal 
testing represents a paradigm shift. With non-invasive testing, the risk 
of miscarriage is eliminated. In fact, the only physical risk to the mother 
is from a simple blood draw. 
The widespread availability and use of these technologies will  
undoubtedly make prenatal testing near-universal, sparking debates over 
the choices that are available to women for prenatal testing and, 
potentially, abortion.78 These technologies will identify more easily and 
precisely those disabilities that are not life-threatening but life-limiting; 
disabilities that often require expensive medical treatment and educa-
tional and therapeutic services to ensure both the highest quality of life 
and achievement. The potential for non-invasive testing technologies to 
avoid disabilities will likely intensify, rather than resolve, existing 
tensions over the proper care and education of children with disabilities.  
 
for determination of non-paternity and consanguinity and the detection of 
adult onset conditions. Id.  
75. See id. 
76. P. Benn et al., Non-Invasive Prenatal Diagnosis for Down Syndrome: The 
Paradigm Will Shift, but Slowly, 39 ULTRASOUND OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 127, 127 (2012). 
77. Mark I. Evans & Michael Kilpatrick, Noninvasive Prenatal Diagnosis: 
2010, 30 CLINICS LABORATORY MED. 655, 655 (2010) (“Looking for fetal 
cells and now nucleic acids has been the holy grail of prenatal diagnosis for 
more than a century.”).  
78. Cf. Peter A. Benn & Audrey R. Chapman, Practical and Ethical 
Considerations of Noninvasive Prenatal Diagnosis, 301 JAMA 2154, 2154 
(2009) (“Noninvasive prenatal diagnosis differs from current approaches 
because all women would receive a definitive diagnosis immediately 
following the blood test.”).  
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III. Legal, Social, and Bioethical Examinations of 
Prenatal Genetic Testing and Disability 
The widespread availability and use of screening and diagnostic  
testing and recent technological advances in prenatal diagnosis have 
challenged social activists, legal scholars, and bioethicists to examine 
many interrelated issues concerning prenatal testing. These concerns 
include how testing affects the experiences of women during and after 
pregnancy and more broadly influences attitudes about the role of people 
with disabilities in American society.79 These examinations consider 
prenatal genetic technologies within the historic context of the eugenics 
movement80 and the potential coercive use of prenatal testing through 
legal mandates81 or by implicit social pressures on women and their 
partners.82 Another area of concern is the role prenatal genetic testing 
plays in the avoidance of the birth of children with disabilities and the 
subsequent exacerbation of long-standing discrimination against those 
with disabilities.83  
Disability is often discussed using distinct models.84 The medical 
model of disability equates it with illness and considers disability as an 
 
79. Although the discussion of clinical practice and procedures is dated, the 
essays that resulted from the National Institutes of Health Workshop 
“Reproductive Genetic Testing: Impact on Women,” provide an excellent 
framework for understanding many of the ethical and social questions 
raised by prenatal testing. See generally WOMEN AND PRENATAL TESTING: 
FACING THE CHALLENGES OF GENETIC TECHNOLOGY (Karen H. Rothenberg 
& Elizabeth J. Thomson eds., 1994). 
80. See, e.g., Sonia Mateu Suter, The Routinization of Prenatal Testing, 28 
AM. J. L. & MED. 233, 234-37 (2002); see generally RUTH SCHWARTZ 
COWAN, HEREDITY AND HOPE: THE CASE FOR GENETIC SCREENING 12-116 
(2008) (providing an overview of the history of both eugenics and genetic 
testing and supporting the use of genetic technologies).  
81. Cf. Michael J. Malinowski, Choosing the Genetic Makeup of Children: Our 
Eugenics Past—Present, and Future?, 36 CONN. L. REV. 125, 211-15 
(2003). 
82. R. Alto Charo & Karen Rothenberg, “The Good Mother”: The Limits of 
Reproductive Accountability and Genetic Choice, in WOMEN & PRENATAL 
TESTING: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF GENETIC TECHNOLOGY 105, 114 
(Karen H. Rothenberg & Elizabeth J. Thomson eds., 1994) (“Women are 
often subjected to communal, as well as personal, pressures to shape their 
reproductive decisions.”). 
83. Deborah Kaplan, Prenatal Screening and Diagnosis: The Impact on 
Persons with Disabilities, in WOMEN & PRENATAL TESTING: FACING THE 
CHALLENGES OF GENETIC TECHNOLOGY 49, 50 (Karen H. Rothenberg & 
Elizabeth J. Thomson eds., 1994) (outlining the three types of prevention 
that are given as reasons for utilizing prenatal testing). 
84. See Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
621, 649-67 (1999). There are some who would argue that a fourth model 
exists: disability as a culture with a distinct group identity, language, and 
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undesirable impairment of human function.85  The social model considers 
the construction of disability as representing a confluence of a person’s 
physical or mental traits and the surrounding environment.86 This model 
considers disability as a social construction, like race, that can be 
stigmatized by a society that collectively struggles to understand, 
accommodate, and accept difference—especially when such difference 
raises the perception of weakness and vulnerability.87 By directing 
attention not at the individual with a disability but at the array of social 
choices that create most of the disadvantage attached to disability, the 
overarching policy implication is to encourage a focus “not on rehabilita-
tion or charity but on eliminating the physical, social, and attitudinal 
barriers that make some physical and mental impairments disabling.”88 
The minority group model of disability uses the social model as a 
foundation but transforms it from an identity to a political call to 
action.89 The minority model is also called the “civil rights” approach 
because of its focus on addressing systemic issues related to the social, 
political, and legal practices that result in the exclusion of people with 
disabilities from equal participation in society.90  
While acknowledging the long history of discrimination and abuse 
against those with disabilities, I choose to analyze disability in a way 
that emphasizes understanding it as an identity that is highly individual-
istic and dependent upon myriad cultural factors in all realms, including 
cultural, physical, and psychological attributes and experience.91 This 
view recognizes that disability is part of the human condition and 
acknowledges that there will likely always be adults and children with 
disabilities due to a wide range of causes that may or may not be 
detectable, preventable, or curable. These reasons might include acute 
 
rituals. See generally CAROL PADDEN & TOM HUMPHRIES, INSIDE DEAF 
CULTURE (2005); Daniela Caruso, Autism in the U.S.: Social Movement 
and Legal Change, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 483, 537 (2010). The decision not to 
include this model in the overall discussion of disability is not intended as 
a judgment about Deaf culture or the “Aspie” movement. I question, 
however, the usefulness of distinguishing the cultural model from the social 
model.  
85. Crossley, supra note 84, at 649-54.  
86. Adam M. Samaha, What Good is the Social Model of Disability?, 74 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1251 (2007).  
87. Crossley, supra note 84, at 654-59 (discussing the social model of 
disability); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and 
“Disability”, 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 427 (2000). 
88. Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic 
Adaption, and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745, 780 (2007). 
89. Crossley, supra note 84, at 659-66. 
90. Id. at 660-62.  
91. Id. at 667. 
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illness, injury, infectious disease, or any other acquired health  
condition.92 The limitations of prenatal testing must also be considered 
within this view because such testing depends upon the application of 
technologies by fallible humans and may also reflect conscious choices 
not to test for certain conditions. Therefore, no test can be considered 
perfect or an absolute guarantee that a child will be born free from all 
genetic conditions. 
This pragmatic approach acknowledges that formal law reflects an 
awkward view of the otherness of people with disabilities. This view is 
demonstrated by the unresolved definition of what “disability” and 
“equality” mean in educational policy development and implementation. 
Does equality mean merely including students with disabilities with 
those without disabilities? Or does it mean ensuring equality of oppor-
tunity, achievement, and advancement?93 Most importantly, this view 
acknowledges that the tension surrounding the education of children 
with disabilities reflects a more global ambivalence, including responsibil-
ity for the education of children with disabilities.94 
 
92. Cf. Neal Halfon et al., The Changing Landscape of Disability in Childhood, 
22 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 13, 15, 19-23 (2012) (providing a historical and 
statistical overview of the changing rates of disability and the evolution of 
notions of disability). 
93. This critique is influenced by the work of Professor Ruth Colker who 
argues that “[t]he field of disability discrimination is undertheorized; it 
conflates “separate” and “unequal.” Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination 
Above All: A Disability Perspective, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1415, 1415 
(2007). Professor Colker has theorized that an integrationist perspective 
has played “an important historical and structural role in helping to close 
some horrendous disability-only institutions” but fails to recognize that the 
government needs to retain some disability only services but protect 
against the coercive use of those facilities by developing policies that reflect 
an anti-subordination perspective. Id. at 1416-17. In the realm of special 
education, this is particularly important for the provision of high quality, 
effective services that reflect an equitable distribution of resources and 
educational expectations that emphasize educational gains. See id.  
94. But see John F. Muller, Disability, Ambivalence, and the Law, 37 AM. J.L. 
& MED. 469, 508-13 (2011) (arguing that ambivalence pervades our 
encounters with disability and that the law should express this 
ambivalence rather than strive for abstract conceptual clarity). I disagree 
with Muller on several points, including his presentation of the disability 
rights movement as somewhat monolithic in its alignment with the 
political left, particularly on the issue of abortion. Moreover, I would argue 
that the law already evidences, albeit without the intentionality Muller 
advocates, an ambivalent view of disability and the role of children and 
adults with disabilities in society. By focusing on access and inclusion as 
the primary goals instead of the maximization of potential for independent 
functioning (at whatever level possible for the individual) while 
simultaneously withdrawing resources to support those who are dependent, 
we perpetuate an ambivalent view of the place of the disabled within our 
society and our responsibilities in addressing their needs.  
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Over the past four decades, in response to the burgeoning use of  
genetic testing, social activists, scholars, lawyers, physicians, and 
bioethicists have debated the potential impact of carrier screening 
programs and prenatal diagnosis on society, individual women, and 
families. The feminist response to questions about prenatal testing, 
disability, and women has not been at all monolithic or simplistic.95 
Some feminist commentators have argued that the availability of 
reproductive choices, including prenatal testing, enhances the autonomy 
of women by allowing them to have access to information—the prenatal 
embodiment of the Jeffersonian maxim that “knowledge is power, that 
knowledge is safety, and that knowledge is happiness.”96  
This view also influenced the reproductive rights movement.  
Although most often focused on advocating against challenges to 
women’s individual choices and interference with personal autonomy and 
procreative liberty, the reproductive rights movement has sometimes 
relied (not without considerable debate and controversy) on public 
support for women’s right to act on the knowledge they receive from 
prenatal testing to have an abortion after the diagnosis of fetal  
anomalies.97  
 
95. See Isabel Karpin & Kristen Savell, PERFECTING PREGNANCY: LAW, 
DISABILITY & THE FUTURE OF REPRODUCTION 42 (2012) (noting “a uniform 
feminist response to prenatal testing technologies may be neither possible 
or desirable” because “these technologies are[] . . . ‘always potentially both’ 
‘liberatory [and] socially controlling . . . depending on the weight various 
social and individual experiences hold in a particular woman's life.’” 
(citation omitted)). 
96. JEFFERSON HIMSELF: THE PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF A MANY-SIDED 
AMERICAN 324 (Bernard Mayo ed., 1942); see also Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 
F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill.), aff’d 915 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 
sub nom Scholberg v. Lifchez, 498 U.S. 1069 (1991) (holding that the 
constitutional right to privacy protects a couple’s decision to use genetic 
diagnostic tests on a conceptus, including embryo biopsy). “[W]ithin the 
cluster of constitutionally protected choices . . . must be . . . the right to 
submit to a medical procedure [to obtain information about the fetus 
through prenatal testing,] which can lead to a decision to abort.” Id. 
97. See, e.g., GENERATIONS AHEAD, BRIDGING THE DIVIDE: DISABILITY RIGHTS 
AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE ADVOCATES DISCUSSING GENETIC 
TECHNOLOGIES 4 (2009) (discussing “fetal anomalies” as a justification for 
supporting abortion rights). The fetal anomaly argument has been 
criticized as justifying eugenic thinking. Id. Another criticism reflects 
inherent tensions within the feminist community resulting from claims of 
moral superiority by women who have abortions after prenatal diagnosis 
over women who have abortions for other reasons. See Roberts, supra note 
2, at 1358-59 (distinguishing the “fetal defect” argument from other 
feminist prochoice claims). “This perverse moral distinction between 
ordinary and so-called ‘medical abortion’ reinforces the reproductive 
stratification that separates women whose childbearing is punished from 
those whose childbearing is technologically promoted by distinguishing 
even between the kinds of abortions they have.” Id. at 1359.  
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Other feminist, social-justice-oriented examinations focus on the  
possibility of prenatal testing becoming culturally or even legally 
mandatory98 and leading to the questioning of women who do not 
undergo all available procedures99 (or lack the resources to access these 
procedures100) and the increased tolerance of eugenic policies.101 The use 
of prenatal testing for gender selection has also created apprehensions 
about allowing free choice because of concerns that widespread use for 
that purpose will result in the further subordination of girls and  
women.102 Another unresolved dilemma concerns balancing the responsi-
bilities and choices of women and their partners with the rights of their 
potential offspring to have an open future and whether these individual 
choices should incur liability.103 
The overarching concern has been ensuring the right to choose not 
to undergo prenatal testing by recognizing that informed choice can only 
be made if a woman receives all the information relevant to the decision 
 
98. Karen H. Rothenberg & Elizabeth J. Thomson, Women and Prenatal 
Testing: An Introduction to the Issues, in WOMEN AND PRENATAL TESTING: 
FACING THE CHALLENGES OF GENETIC TECHNOLOGY 1, 1-2 (Karen H. 
Rothenberg & Elizabeth J. Thomson eds., 1994); see Charo & Rothenberg, 
supra note 82, at 107-09 (describing how choice may be illusory for many 
women because of the pressures that may be exerted on them regarding 
their reproductive decisions). 
99. Charo & Rothenberg, supra note 82, at 107 (“A woman’s decision to 
conceive, abort, or bear a child with genetic disorders may be subject to 
questions of personal, as well as communal accountability.”). 
100. See Mary B. Mahowald, Genetic Technologies and Their Implications for 
Women, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 439, 445-46 (1996) (“Chief among 
the material factors that affect women significantly are those that limit the 
availability of genetic services . . . . Because of their financial inability to 
follow-through on test results, some poor women decline to avail 
themselves of genetic tests and counseling where the costs would be 
covered by others.”). 
101. LORI B. ANDREWS, FUTURE PERFECT: CONFRONTING DECISIONS ABOUT 
GENETICS 80-81, 90-103 (2001).  
102. See generally Kimberly Kristin Downing, A Feminist Is A Person Who 
Answers “Yes” to the Question, “Are Women Human?”: An Argument 
Against the Use of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for Gender 
Selection, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 431 (2005).  
103. The discussions about the responsibilities of parents to provide children 
with a right to an open future considers several implications of prenatal 
genetic testing, including the use of preimplanation genetic diagnosis to 
have a child with a particular disability so that the child be part of their 
own culture or community, and the constraints that should be placed on 
these choices through public policy and tort liability. See generally Dena S. 
Davis, Genetic Dilemmas and the Child’s Right to an Open Future, 28 
RUTGERS L.J. 549, 555, 559-67 (1997) (discussing these issues within the 
context of Feinberg’s concept of “the child’s right to an open future”).  
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and feels free of coercion or persuasion.104 The discussions of the poten-
tial for coercion focused attention on the possible abusive use of  
reproductive technologies not only in totalitarian states but also through 
social pressure in more democratic societies.105 These discussions included 
considerations of the potential risk of prosecution for women who 
declined prenatal testing or tort actions undertaken by children born 
with disabilities against mothers for refusing to undergo testing or 
providing treatment that might have improved their outcomes.106 The 
most disturbing scenarios have not yet materialized. However, the debate 
over prenatal testing continues to be informed by the potential social and 
moral consequences of women feeling that they cannot exercise free agency 
because they are pressured to submit to prenatal testing—an action that 
represents one of the first acts of responsible mothering.107  
Disability scholars and activists have focused on the potential abuses 
of prenatal testing and its meaning in the context of the historic  
treatment of people with disabilities. The most ardent disability rights 
critique, the expressivist argument, considers the fetal anomaly argument 
an anathema. The expressivist argument holds that the use of prenatal 
testing is fundamentally incompatible with the belief that society can 
work both to decrease the incidence of disability and support people 
living with disabilities.108 “Simply put, the argument is that prenatal 
testing sends the message to people with disabilities that their lives are 
 
104. ANDREWS, supra note 101, at 103-06 (discussing protecting the right to 
refuse genetic testing). It is important to note the emergence of a corollary 
issue; state laws providing tort immunity to physicians who deliberately 
withhold information from patients to prevent abortions. These laws allow 
physicians to withhold results obtained from maternal serum screenings, 
ultrasounds, CVS, amniocentesis, or noninvasive prenatal testing if the 
physician believes the woman may have an abortion. Such a law been 
enacted in Arizona. See S.B. 1359, 50th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2012). 
This law may have unintended consequences, including inappropriate 
management of pregnancies because a woman will not be prepared for the 
delivery of a newborn with complications resulting from an undisclosed 
disability.  
105. See Charo & Rothenberg, supra note 82, at 107-14, 117-22. 
106. See Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Making Mommies: Law, Pre-Implantation 
Genetic Diagnosis, and the Complications of Pre-Motherhood, 18 COLUM. 
J. GENDER & L. 313, 324 (2008). 
107. Abby Lippman, The Genetic Construction of Prenatal Testing: Choice, 
Consent, or Conformity, in WOMEN & PRENATAL TESTING: FACING THE 
CHALLENGES OF GENETIC TECHNOLOGY 105, 114 (Karen H. Rothenberg & 
Elizabeth J. Thomson eds., 1994) (discussing how prenatal testing is 
viewed within other established behaviors that connote responsible 
mothering).  
108. Mary B. Mahowald, Aren’t We All Eugenicists? Commentary on Paul 
Lombard’s “Taking Eugenics Seriously”, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 219, 227-29 
(2003). 
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not worth living.”109 It cannot be reconciled with efforts to include people 
with disabilities. No distinctions can be made about what conditions are 
acceptable to select for or unacceptable to select for because some 
condition, group, or person will always be deemed unacceptable.110 
The more nuanced disability rights critique does not focus on an  
absolute approach to the morality of abortion, though it still considers 
the choice to use prenatal testing if followed by selective abortion as 
morally problematic and the result of misinformation.111 For those who 
identify as both pro-choice feminists and as disability rights activists, the 
goal of the disability rights movement concerning abortion is the right 
not to have an abortion and to make choices reflecting the belief that 
raising a child with a disability is not necessarily undesirable.112 This 
critique views continuing, persistent, and pervasive discrimination as the 
major problem people with disabilities confront.113 Prenatal diagnosis is 
viewed as an extension of that discrimination because it reinforces the 
medical model of disability by drawing attention away from solving the 
societal discrimination people with disabilities face.114 Accordingly, this 
critique holds that using prenatal genetic tests has pernicious effects on 
the lives of existing disabled people by expressing a hurtful view of them 
and reducing human diversity—with the ultimate result of hindering the 
societal goal of recognizing and promoting equality.115 Proponents of the 
disability rights critique believe that women who choose to undergo 
prenatal diagnosis may reject an otherwise desired child, believing that 
the child’s disability will diminish their parental experience. This 
suggests that these women are unwilling to accept any significant 
 
109. Id. at 229. 
110. Cf. id. (stating a formulation of prenatal testing that a single trait 
standing for a whole obliterates the whole with “no need to find out about 
the rest” (internal quotation omitted)). But see Janet Malek, Deciding 
Against Disability: Does the Use of Reproductive Genetic Technologies 
Express Disvalue for People with Disabilities?, 36 J. MED. ETHICS 217, 217 
(2010) (arguing the expressivist objection is misguided and that the use of  
reproductive genetic technologies to prevent disability in future children 
does not convey a negative message about those with disabilities). 
111. See Adrienne Asch, Disability Equality and Prenatal Testing: 
Contradictory or Compatible?, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 315-16 (2003). 
112. See generally Marsha Saxton, Disability Rights and Selective Abortion, in 
ABORTION WARS: A HALF CENTURY OF STRUGGLE, 1950–2000 (Rickie 
Solinger ed., 1998). 
113. Asch, supra note 111, at 320-21 (citing Peter Singer, Severe Impairment 
and the Beginning of Life, 99 APA NEWSL. PHI. & MED. 246, 247-48 
(2000)). 
114. See id.  
115. Id. at 333 (citing Adrienne Asch, Why I Haven’t Changed My Mind About 
Prenatal Diagnosis: Reflections and Refinements, in PRENATAL TESTING 
AND DISABILITY RIGHTS 234 (Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., 2000)). 
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departure from more conventional parental dreams for that child and fail 
to consider that parenting a child with a disability can provide the  
child-rearing experience they desire.116  
Those who come to disability advocacy as a result of being the  
parent or caretaker of a person with disabilities are divided about 
prenatal testing and its impact on the resources available to care for 
those with disabilities.117 Some embrace the loss-of-support argument and 
believe that prenatal genetic testing will diminish the acceptance of 
people with disabilities and may discourage government funding for 
research and social and educational services.118 Among parents of 
children and young adults with intellectual disabilities like Down 
syndrome, the loss-of-support argument extends to the realm of social 
interactions—a fear that without the birth of children with Down 
syndrome, it will be a lonelier world for those with Down syndrome.119  
There are those who also personalize the moral dimensions. “Some 
caregivers regard such tests—which can lead to abortions after unfavor-
able results—as an affront to the equal humanity of their loved ones.”120 
In contrast, “[o]thers quietly note the value of such testing[] and even 
suggest that terminating a pregnancy is sometimes the better course.”121 
The willingness to support termination among disability advocates and 
caretakers usually involves the diagnosis of severe disabilities like 
anencephaly or syndromes that result in death during infancy or  
childhood such as Tay-Sachs disease122 or spinal muscular atrophy (types 
 
116. Id. at 316 (“[M]ost people seek in child rearing . . . ‘to give ourselves to a 
new being who starts out with the best we can give, and who will enrich 
us, gladden others, contribute to the world, and make us proud.’” 
(quotation omitted). 
117. Pollack, supra note 3. 
118. Id. 
119. Amy Harmon, Prenatal Test Puts Down Syndrome in Hard Focus, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 9, 2007, at A1. 
120. Pollack, supra note 3. 
121. Id. 
122. See Tay-Sachs Disease, A.D.A.M. MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0002390/ (last updated 
Nov. 17, 2010) (defining Tay-Sachs disease as a “deadly disease of the 
nervous system passed down through families”).  
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I and II)123: life-threatening, as opposed to life-altering or life-limiting, 
conditions.124 
IV. Shaping Choices: The Prenatally and Postnatally 
Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act 
There are various medical, social, economic, and personal rationales 
underlying whether to use prenatal testing and what information a 
woman may learn from undergoing testing. For some women, the 
purpose of prenatal testing is solely for information gathering—to 
provide reassurance about their pregnancy or to give their health care 
providers and families time to prepare for the delivery and care of a 
child with a diagnosed disability. Regardless of one’s rationale for 
testing, prenatal testing indisputably allows women to learn about 
potential fetal health and may compel them to make choices in response 
to that knowledge. Whether consciously understood or acknowledged, 
women make choices regarding the use of prenatal testing and the 
resulting information in a complex environment of conflicting opinions 
and agendas about pregnancy, abortion, disability, motherhood, and 
parental and family responsibilities.125 All pregnant women, especially 
those women carrying fetuses affected by genetic conditions, must 
confront questions and face choices that lend themselves to an entire 
body of philosophical literature: What makes for a “good life?” What is 
the measure and value of health and human capacity?126  
For the minority of women who receive test results revealing a fetal 
anomaly, their choices are both limited in number and infinite in 
potential challenges. In the very small subset of cases where medical 
intervention is possible, some women might seek fetal surgery in an 
effort to ameliorate the effects of an anomaly.127 The other choices are 
 
123. See Spinal Muscular Atrophy, A.D.A.M. MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001991/ (last updated 
Feb. 1, 2012) (defining spinal muscular atrophy as a “group of inherited 
diseases that cause muscle damage and weakness, which get worse over 
time and eventually lead to death”). 
124. See Sonia M. Suter, A Brave New World of Designer Babies?, 22 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897, 966 (2007); see also Bonnie Steinbock, 
Disability, Prenatal Testing, and Selective Abortion, in PRENATAL TESTING 
AND DISABILITY RIGHTS 108, 109 (Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., 2000) 
(noting that even many of those “who are almost always opposed to 
abortion” will accept it in cases involving “a severe disability in the fetus”). 
125. Suter, supra note 124. 
126. Asch, supra note 111, at 322-23 n.9. 
127. See Eveline H. Shue et al., Maternal-Fetal Surgery: History and General 
Considerations, 39 CLINICS PERINATOLOGY 269, 269 (2012). In discussing 
the issues and questions raised by this Article, it is important to consider 
that fetal surgery for spina bifida is not curative; successful outcomes 
ameliorate the severity of life-long impairments. Children born after these 
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preparing to parent a child with a disability, placing the child for 
adoption,128 or terminating the pregnancy.  
An essential starting point in the examination of the meaning of 
those choices for women regarding prenatal testing and disability is 
acknowledging that “because a child’s disability is viewed as a private 
problem for the family, the gendered attribution of responsibilities for 
family health to women obligates them to deal with it alone whether by 
avoiding, reducing or managing disability.”129 Pregnant women face these 
responsibilities in terms of the immediate issue of fetal health. After 
birth, for both biological and social reasons, women remain overwhelm-
ingly in the highly stressful position of primary caretaker and must begin 
to confront future issues related to nurturing, rearing, and educating 
children.130 These stresses are exacerbated considering that the caregiver 
role is seen as an operation in the private sphere with little or no 
systemic supports.131 Stresses are further compounded when women must 
confront these challenges alone and in poverty.132  
Proponents of expanding prenatal testing to all women recognize 
these concerns. In an interview with the New York Times, Dr. Deborah 
Driscoll, lead author of the ACOG Practice Bulletins, acknowledged 
 
procedures will often still require early intervention therapeutic and special 
education services. See Enrico Danzer et al., Fetal Myelomeningocele 
Surgery: Preschool Functional Status Using the Functional Independence 
Measure for Children (WeeFIM), 27 CHILD’S NERVOUS SYS. 1083 (2011). 
128. Several organizations provide information and resources for families seeking 
to make adoption plans for a child with Down syndrome and families 
seeking to adopt a child with Down syndrome. See, e.g., National Down 
Syndrome Adoption Network, DOWN SYNDROME ASS’N OF GREATER 
CINCINNATI, http://dsagc.com/programs_adoption.asp (last visited Feb. 
18, 2013). 
129. Abby Lippman, Prenatal Genetic Testing and Screening: Constructing 
Needs and Reinforcing Inequities, 17 AM. J.L. MED. 15, 39 (1991).  
130. See also Rapp & Ginsburg, supra note 29, at 390 (describing the striking 
gender differences among mothers and fathers regarding changing work 
trajectories and involvement in efforts to support their child’s differences). 
131. See Philip N. Cohen & Mriuna Petrescu-Parhova, Gendered Living 
Arrangements of Children with Disabilities, 68 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 630, 
635 (2006) (finding that based on data on disabilities from the 2000 
Census, children (aged five to fifteen years) with disabilities live 
disproportionately with women and are more likely to live with their single 
parent mothers). 
132. See Mark Stabile & Sara Allin, The Economic Costs of Childhood 
Disability, 22 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 65, 69-78 (2012); see also PETER D. 
BRANDON & DENNIS P. HOGAN, THE EFFECTS OF CHILDREN WITH 
DISABILITIES ON MOTHERS’ EXITS FROM WELFARE 3, 14 (2001); Karen 
Syma Czapanskiy, Disabled Kids and Their Moms: Caregivers and 
Horizontal Equity, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY LAW & POL’Y 43, 46 (2012) 
(analyzing the socio-economic causes of the inequities experienced by 
families of children with disabilities).  
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“there are many couples who do not want to have a baby with Down 
syndrome . . . . They don’t have the resources, don’t have the emotional 
stamina, don’t have the family support. We are recommending this 
testing be offered so that parents have a choice.”133 
Those opposed to prenatal testing because of opposition to abortion 
have routinely criticized the information prospective parents are given 
by health professionals providing prenatal testing about what it is like to 
have and raise a child with Down syndrome. Opponents of prenatal 
testing have argued that health professionals too often focus on only dire 
outcomes and the hardest challenges rather than the positive experienc-
es. According to these critics, this counseling places undue pressure on 
parents to terminate pregnancies affected with Down syndrome and 
consequently reduces the number of individuals living with Down 
syndrome.134 Even supporters of prenatal testing and healthcare  
professionals acknowledge the negative impact of the model of disability 
and the difficulties clinicians face in providing a balanced description of 
Down syndrome when counseling patients.135  
In 2007, Senator Sam Brownback introduced legislation,  
co-sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy, called the Prenatally and 
Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act.136 Congress passed the 
Act on September 25, 2008 by a voice vote, and President George W. 
Bush signed the bill into law on October 8, 2008.137 Groups across the 
political spectrum hailed the passage of the Act and considered it an 
opportunity to elevate the national discourse around disability and to 
provide additional information to women who choose to raise children 
with disabilities without including anti-choice language or provisions.138 
The Act is intended to increase the provision of scientifically sound 
information and support services to patients receiving a positive  
diagnosis for Down syndrome or other prenatally and postnatally 
 
133. Harmon, supra note 119, at A22; see also ACOG Practice Bulletin No. 88, 
supra note 39; ACOG Practice Bulletin No. 77, supra note 39, at 219. 
134. See Brian G. Skotko, With New Prenatal Testing, Will Babies with Down 
Syndrome Slowly Disappear?, 94 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 823, 
825 (2009) (“Parents who have children with DS have already found much 
richness in life with an extra chromosome. Now is the time for the rest of 
us to discuss the ethics of our genetic futures.”). 
135. Catriona Hippman et al., What Is a “Balanced” Description? Insight from 
Parents of Individuals with Down Syndrome, 21 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 35 
(2011). 
136. S. 1810, 110th Cong. (2007). 
137. See S. 1810 (110th): Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions 
Awareness Act, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/ 
110/s1810 (last visited Feb. 18, 2013). 
138. Rebecca Dresser, Prenatal Testing & Disability: A Truce in the Culture 
Wars?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar. 2009, 7-8 (discussing the 
collaboration and compromise that resulted in the Act’s passage). 
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diagnosed conditions.139 The Act’s focus is exclusively on collection and 
dissemination of information instead of research, funding, provision of 
services, or other actions designed to address the actual needs of families 
and children. This is likely one reason passage was supported by such 
divergent and diverse groups. Although the Act places no mandates or 
requirements on health professionals, professional organizations, includ-
ing the National Society of Genetic Counselors, use the language of the 
Act as a guidepost in issuing practice guidelines.140  
According to Professor Rebecca Dresser, the Act reflects an attempt 
to find common ground among pro-choice, pro-life, and disability 
advocates and marks a promising sign of compromise in the culture war 
over prenatal diagnosis in reproductive choice.141 Because the Act 
situates women’s choices about pregnancy within the standard informed 
consent framework and references to “up-to-date [and] evidence based” 
information, it may help rebuff the impact of recent laws that ostensibly 
promote informed choice, but in fact require the delivery of inaccurate 
and partisan information about the risks and outcomes of abortion.142 
But given the current political climate and recent state legislative 
enactments, Professor Dresser’s predication may prove overly optimistic. 
Prenatal diagnosis via currently established modalities is still legal and 
will likely remain so, but outright prohibitions are not the only means to 
restrict women’s abilities to make choices about pregnancy.143 Currently 
existing laws will likely have a chilling effect on women’s access to 
choices even as the standards of care and technology make prenatal 
testing one of the cornerstones of obstetrical patient care. These include 
measures that require the dissemination of potentially medically suspect 
 
139. Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act,  
Pub. L. No. 110-374, 122 Stat. 4501 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201, 280g-8). 
140. See Kathryn B. Sheets et al., Practice Guidelines for Communicating a 
Prenatal or Postnatal Diagnosis of Down Syndrome: Recommendations of 
the National Society of Genetic Counselors, 20 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 
432, 436 (2001) (citing the Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Condition 
Awareness Act of 2008 in providing practice guidelines for genetic 
counselors); see also Devers et al., supra note 37. 
141. Cf. Dresser, supra note 138, at 7. 
142. See id. at 8. 
143. The term “restrict” is an intentional acknowledgement that even as the 
Court has whittled away at the right to abortion over the last two decades, 
the core right to choose an abortion remains protected. See Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 840-41 
(1992) (upholding certain restrictions on a woman’s right to access 
abortion including forced waiting period and informed consent 
requirements); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007) (upholding a 
Congressional ban on a second-trimester abortion procedure termed 
“partial birth abortion”). 
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information,144 medically unnecessary ultrasound scans prior to  
abortions,145 and laws personifying embryos and fetuses.146 The most 
 
144. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(e)(i)-(ii) (2005) (requiring 
physicians to advise women seeking abortions that they face an increased 
risk of suicide and suicidal thoughts if they obtain the procedure); see also 
Planned Parenthood Minnesota v. Rounds, 683 F.3d 889, 905-06 (8th Cir. 
2012) (holding that requiring disclosure to patients seeking an abortion of 
an increased risk of suicide ideation and suicide was constitutional because 
the suicide advisory was non-misleading and relevant to the patient’s 
decision to have an abortion, therefore it did not violate physicians’ free 
speech rights). Cf. Vignetta E. Charles, et al., Abortion and Long-term 
Mental Health Outcomes: A Systemic Review of the Evidence, 78 
CONTRACEPTION 436 (2008) (suggesting “few, if any, differences between 
women who had abortions and their respective comparison groups in terms 
of mental health sequelae”).  
145. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West 2012), 
requires that a pregnant woman certify in writing her understanding that 
(1) Texas law requires an ultrasound prior to obtaining an abortion, (2) 
she has the option to view the sonogram images, (3) she has the option to 
hear the fetal heartbeat, and (4) she is required to hear the medical 
explanation of the sonogram unless she falls under the narrow exceptions to 
this requirement. The three exceptions are (1) pregnancy as a result of rape 
or incest which has been reported or, if it has not been reported, was not 
reported because the woman reasonably risks retaliation resulting in serious 
bodily injury, (2) a minor taking advantage of judicial bypass procedures 
to avoid parental notification, or (3) a fetus with an irreversible medical 
condition or abnormality. If seeking to avoid the description of the 
sonogram images, the woman must indicate within which exception she 
falls. But compare Carolyn Jones, We Have No Choice: One Woman’s 
Ordeal with Texas’ New Sonogram Law, TEXAS OBSERVER, Mar. 15, 2012 
(describing a personal experience of being compelled to undergo a 
sonogram and read and listen to information about fetal development and 
abide by a waiting period before an abortion of a fetus with a lethal 
anomaly because the medical personnel did not know that the diagnosis of 
a fetal anomaly excused compliance with the newly enacted measure).  
146. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-23B-2(5) (2011) (finding that a fetus feels pain 
after twenty weeks and subjecting a fetus to painful stimuli may cause 
disabilities later in life); Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act, 2013 
ARK. ACTS 171 (banning abortions for women past twelve weeks of 
pregnancy), ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1104 (West 2011) (requiring the 
physician notify the patient of potential risk of the surgery as well as the 
availability of anesthetics to reduce the pain of the fetus); IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 18-503(5) (2011) (finding that anesthesia is used to reduce the pain 
of the fetus during surgical procedures); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.4242 
(West 2011) (stating that consent is only determined after, among other 
requirements, the female is given notice of the availability of anesthetics to 
reduce the pain of the fetus); MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.027 (West 2012) 
(requiring the physician to notify the patient that anesthetic is available to 
alleviate pain to the fetus during the procedure); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-3, 
104-05 (2010) (finding that an unborn fetus feels pain after twenty weeks, 
anesthesia will reduce the pain felt during a medical procedure, and a 
doctor must notify the patient of these facts before performing the 
procedure); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.9 (2006) (requiring the 
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obvious example is providing physicians with immunity from tort 
liability for intentionally not telling a woman her fetus has an anomaly 
detected by ultrasound or other form of prenatal testing.147 These 
measures will likely restrict women’s right to choose termination after 
prenatal testing even if there is not an absolute prohibition on  
abortions.148  
Professor Mary Mahowald has argued that  
while individuals are unable to care adequately for a child in some 
instances, the same is hardly true for society as a whole, at least in 
the developed world. Collectively, society has all the resources 
necessary to care adequately for all of its people: healthy newborns, 
those with disabilities, or anyone who needs care that is not  
available through parents or other family members. Accordingly,  
society in general does not have the justification that some pregnant 
women may have for testing and abortion of fetuses whose subse-
quent care may be impossible for them to provide.149  
Professor Mahowald’s argument is based on the belief that an enlight-
ened society generally accepts these additional costs and burdens as just, 
recognizing that any one of us might have been born with or acquire 
such a disease or disability. 
This formulation raises the question about whether the Act and simi-
lar measures intended to ensure “balance” in the presentation of 
information about the lives of children and adults with genetic  
conditions truly promotes both informed consent and choice, given the 
privatization of responsibility for disability and the fact that pregnant 
women’s choices are being increasingly constricted. Depending on a 
family’s ability to access services from public schools and other govern-
ment institutions, the disclosure of information as embodied by the Act on 
“the range of outcomes for individuals living with the diagnosed condition, 
 
physician to notify the patient if anesthetics would reduce the pain of the 
fetus during the procedure). 
147. See, e.g., S.B. 1359, 50 Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
§ 12-719 (relieving physicians from liability for damages based on a claim 
that but for an act or omission of the defendant, a child or children would 
not or should not have been born).  
148. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 171 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“[A]t stake in cases challenging abortion restrictions is a 
woman’s ‘control over her [own] destiny.’”). A comprehensive discussion of 
the issue of the intersection of prenatal genetic testing and abortion and 
the related relationship between technological innovations in prenatal 
testing and current law and practice is beyond the scope of this Article. 
For such discussion, see Rachel Rebouché & Karen Rothenberg, Mixed 
Messages: The Intersection of Prenatal Testing and Abortion, 55 HOW. 
L.J. 983, 986 (2012).  
149. Mahowald, supra note 108, at 232. 
Health Matrix·Volume 23·Issue 1·2013 
What Does Choice Really Mean? 
84 
including physical, developmental, educational, and psychosocial out-
comes” may actually present an unrealistic and unattainable—or even 
coercive—picture of the choice to parent a child with a disability.150 
 
150. But cf. Dov Fox & Christopher L. Griffin, Jr., Disability-Selective Abortion 
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, UTAH L. REV. 845 (2009). 
Professors Fox and Griffin argue that the public meaning of particular 
practices can interact with existing norms to generate “expressive 
externalities” on social relations and behaviors. They suggest that the ADA 
may have encouraged prospective parents to terminate pregnancies affected 
by Down syndrome by giving rise to demeaning media depiction and social 
conditions that reinforced negative understandings and expectations among 
prospective parents about what it means to have a child with a disability. 
They do not claim to have detected a causal statistical relationship 
between the ADA and changes in the Down syndrome birthrate and 
acknowledge that “[t]he absence of data on actual Down-selective 
terminations and of comprehensive interview responses by prospective 
parents who face this decision caution against drawing broad conclusions.” 
Id. at 847, 883. Nevertheless, they argue that the statistical evidence is 
suggestive of a correlation of the impact of disability-selective abortion and 
may give reason to advance public education campaigns to correct 
misleading social perceptions. Id. at 871, 893. I find Professors Fox and 
Griffin’s arguments intriguing and appreciate their acknowledgement that 
their “findings [do not] justify restrictions on a woman’s constitutional 
right to terminate a pregnancy for any reason, at least until the third 
trimester.” Id. at 893. But, I would argue that even more caution is 
required as suggested by their own caveat that a complex array of legal, 
material, economic, technological, social, familial, and medical factors 
might reasonably inform prenatal testing and selective abortion for Down 
syndrome indicates the limits of formal law in creating a causal connection 
between the dissemination of information either in public information 
campaigns or in individual private consultations by women with their 
health care providers and any resulting individual private action. See id. at 
883-85. Their analysis also conflicts with my own experience advising 
health care professionals developing policies and procedures for counseling 
patients undergoing prenatal testing, representing families of children with 
genetic disorders, and observing the highly personal and complex factors 
that contribute to the decision to terminate a pregnancy diagnosed with 
Down syndrome or another genetic disorder. In Professors Fox and 
Griffin’s own words, “[a] skeptical reader might even accept [or at least 
find them carefully developed and well-argued] our statistical findings but 
still not agree with our narrative premise.” Id. at 871. I also disagree with 
their emphasis on supplementing the passage of certain civil rights laws 
with public education campaigns on behalf of the protected group in 
question as a way of securing the promise of civil rights and self-respect for 
those in need of the law’s protection. See id. at 893. While public 
education campaigns are a worthy endeavor, the externality that would 
result in measurable differences in the life experience of children and adults 
with disabilities is the allocation of public resources and health, education, 
and social services. 
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V. The Illusion of Special Education:  
The Privatization of Resources and Choice 
A. Public Special Education and the IDEA 
Public special education provides an opportunity to consider how the 
privatization of responsibility for children with disabilities affects access to 
the choices that may ultimately determine the outcome of these children’s 
lives.151 This section will provide a brief overview of the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and discuss the increasing transfer of 
responsibility for the education of children with disabilities to the private 
sector. This shift has resulted in the contraction—not expansion—of 
choices available to parents of children with disabilities. 
For parents of children with disabilities, educational issues are often a 
primary concern.152 This concern arises from personal responsibilities and 
the more global reality that the public school system is the government 
institution that families of children with disabilities are most likely to 
interact with.153 Concerns about education also relate to the tremendous 
responsibilities parents shoulder under the IDEA.154 The IDEA is based on 
the expectation that parents serve as private “attorneys general” that 
enforce the law, protect their children’s rights, and ensure access to 
services.155  
American public school districts provide special education services to 
children with a diverse range of disabilities. The IDEA mandates that a 
child receive special education if he has at least one of fourteen  
 
151. Wendy F. Hensel, Vouchers for Students with Disabilities: The Future of 
Special Education?, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 291, 327 (2010). 
152. See Teresa Scruton, Bardet Biedel Syndrome (BBS), ORPHAN  
DISEASE NETWORK, http://www.orphandiseasenetwork.org/ciliopathies-
bbs-meckel-gruber-joubert-jeune-lca-nphp/bardet-biedl-syndrome-bbs/ (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2013) (“[T]he issue that worried caregivers the most  
was . . . management and nutrition, with 66% reporting this concern. 
Closely following weight management were concerns for their child’s 
education (53%) . . . .”).  
153. See Cohen & Petrescu-Parhova, supra note 131, at 630-31.  
154. See generally Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C.  
§ 1400 et seq. (2006). 
155. See Erin Phillips, When Parents Aren’t Enough: External Advocacy in 
Special Education, 117 YALE L.J. 1802, 1828 n.127 (2008) (“[T]he IDEA 
assumes that parents are willing to make the extra effort to participate in 
the special education process. There are certainly families in which, for 
whatever reason, the parent will not be sufficiently motivated to fight for a 
FAPE for his child.”). There are also certainly families in which, for 
reasons including lack of personal motivation and external forces such as 
poverty, parental disability, illiteracy, that the parent will not be able to 
marshal the resources necessary to advocate for their child.  
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enumerated impairments156 and thus requires special education and related 
services.157 The IDEA provides educational services to eligible children 
until age twenty-one and has grown to include over 9 percent of students 
ages six through twenty-one.158  
The number of children qualifying for special education under the 
IDEA is growing. This is for several reasons, including: greater acknowl-
edgment of the needs of children with disabilities;159 improvements in 
technology that shift mortality to chronic morbidity;160 federal policy 
guidance that expanded eligibility to include children with attention 
deficit disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder under the 
category “Otherwise Health Impaired”; and the significant increase in 
the number of children diagnosed with autism.161 Another explanation 
focuses on the expansive use of the term “specific learning disability.” 
This may be exacerbated by the efforts of school districts serving low-
income populations to obtain funds for students who previously would 
have been considered non-disabled low-achievers.162  
 
156. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.  
§ 1401(3)(A)(i), (B)(i) (2006). 
157. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(a) (2012). 
158. “In 2006, a total of 6,081,890 students ages six through twenty-one were 
served under IDEA, Part B.” DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 30TH ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH 
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT, at xx (2008). “Of these students, 5,986,644 
were served in the 50 states, the District of Columbia and Bureau of Indian 
Education schools.” Id. This number represented 9.1 percent of the general 
population ages six through twenty-one. Id. 
159. The fact that the number of children considered disabled by public schools 
systems has increased despite increasing use of prenatal genetic testing has 
not yet entered the debates over prenatal genetic testing and reproductive 
choice. A discussion of this important topic and the potential consequences 
for the development of legislation affecting both pregnant women and 
children with disabilities enrolled in public schools is beyond the scope of 
this Article but should receive future attention from legal scholars, 
geneticists and genetic counselors, and other academic disciplines. 
160. See Paul H. Wise, Emerging Technologies and Their Impact on Disability, 
169 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 169, 174 (2012).  
161. See Laudan Aron & Pamela Loprest, Disability and the Education System, 
22 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 97, 102 (2012).  
162. By contrast, another cynical explanation, popular among conservative 
social critics, is that social changes have resulted in destigmatizing 
disability among affluent parents. These parents now purposely have their 
children diagnosed with learning disabilities to obtain advantages such as 
extended time on college admissions tests. See Wade F. Horn & Douglas 
Tynan, Time to Make Special Education “Special” Again, in RETHINKING 
SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEW CENTURY 23, 28-31 (Chester E. Finn et al. 
eds., 2001). 
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The growing acceptance of disability and efforts to address the needs 
of children with disabilities represents a significant evolution in social 
attitudes and public policy about the right to a public education. 
Beginning with Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, the practice of 
ending the unequal treatment of children by public schools became a 
defining issue for civil rights movements.  Building upon Brown,  
advocates for children with disabilities began to argue that children with 
disabilities were entitled to access to public schools, either by integration 
into the regular classroom or by the provision of special programs that 
may have been separate but at least equal. 
Until the 1970s, it was common for many children with severe  
intellectual and physical disabilities to languish in institutions even if 
their families had resources.  This was because of the stigma surrounding 
disability—particularly intellectual disabilities.163 Laws in most states 
allowed school districts to refuse to enroll students they considered 
“uneducable,” which local school district officials could define as they 
chose.164 Although there were nascent efforts by the federal government 
in the 1950s and 1960s to provide resources to address the educational 
needs of children with disabilities, no state served all of these children.165 
The few programs that did offer help were often misguided, sometimes 
placing all children together, regardless of need, simply because they 
were “handicapped.”166  
The IDEA requires that states identify, locate, and evaluate “[a]ll 
children with disabilities residing in the State . . . who are in need of 
special education and related services.”167 An essential principle of the 
IDEA is “zero exclusion,” the proposition that severity of disability 
cannot be used to exclude a child from school or receiving educational 
 
163. See § 20 U.S.C. 1400(c)(2)(A)-(D) (2006) (providing a brief overview of the 
history of the exclusion of children with disabilities from public schools). 
164. MARK C. WEBER, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND LITIGATION TREATISE 1:2 
(3d ed. Supp. 2010) (summarizing court decisions allowing for the exclusion 
of children with disabilities from the public schools); see also Watson v. 
City of Cambridge, 132 N.E. 864, 864-865 (Mass. 1893) (upholding the 
expulsion from public school of a child considered “weak minded”); State 
ex rel. Beattie v. Board of Educ., 172 N.W. 153, 154-55 (Wis. 1919) 
(approving the exclusion from public schools a boy who had drooled 
uncontrollably, displayed facial contortions, and had a speech impairment); 
Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Haas, 154 N.E.2d 265, 270 (Ill. 1958) (finding 
that existing state laws requiring compulsory schooling did not require that 
children with disabilities receive a free public education). 
165. Edwin W. Martin et al., The Legislative and Litigation History of Special 
Education, 6 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 25, 25-27 (1996) (discussing the 
historical background of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act). 
166. Cf. id. at 26-27. 
167. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (a)(3)(A) (2006). 
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services from the responsible local educational authority.168 These 
requirements represent a hard-won change over the systemic exclusion of 
children with disabilities from public schools before access to public 
education become a right recognized by the courts and enshrined in 
federal statutes.169  
In 1972, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania held in Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. 
Pennsylvania170 that depriving disabled students who were deemed not to 
have had attained a mental age of five years from entering school 
violated the Equal Protection Clause and thus enjoined the  
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania from applying the statute to disabled 
students.171 The same year, in Mills v. Board of Education,172 the US 
District Court for the District of Columbia held that the Constitution 
required the District of Columbia to provide a publicly supported 
education for disabled children.173 The court found that if sufficient funds 
are not available to finance all of the necessary services, then available 
funds must be expended equitably and “cannot be permitted to bear 
more heavily on the ‘exceptional’ or handicapped child than on the 
normal child.”174 PARC and Mills directed attention to the ideas that 
the constitutional principles of equal protection and due process entitled 
children with disabilities to publicly supported education suited to their 
needs and that children with disabilities could and should be educated in 
public schools.175 Congress was spurred to action by the increased focus 
on the needs and educational rights of disabled children reflected and 
reinforced in these cases and a growing lobbying effort undertaken by 
parents and organizations focused on addressing the needs of children 
with disabilities and advocating for their greater inclusion in American 
society.176 
 
168. Timothy W. v. Rochester Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 954, 960 (1st Cir. 1989); 
Thomas v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 918 F.2d 618, 620 (6th Cir. 1990).  
169. See generally WEBER, supra note 164, at 1:1-1:5 (summarizing court 
decisions allowing for the exclusion of children with disabilities from the 
public schools).  
170. 343 F. Supp. 279, 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
171. Id. 
172. 348 F. Supp. 866, 866 (D.D.C. 1972).  
173. Id. at 876. 
174. Id.  
175. Jon Romberg, The Means Justify the Ends: Structural Due Process in 
Special Education Law, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 415, 423 (2011) (quoting 
Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 193-94 (1982)). 
176. Martin et al., supra note 165, at 28-29 (discussing the historical 
background of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act). 
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In 1975, Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped  
Children Act (EAHCA).177 The law was not without its critics. President 
Gerald Ford believed the bill would be too costly, interfere with state 
responsibilities, and “upset the balance of relationships between parents 
and local schools.”178 While Congress sought to open the door of public 
education to disabled students by mandating that children in states 
accepting EAHCA funds receive a free public program of education and 
training appropriate to their capacities, the Act did not necessarily 
guarantee any particular level of education to children with disabilities 
once they were inside the schoolhouse doors.179  
Despite these limitations, the IDEA represents a significant  
evolution in society’s attitudes toward children with disabilities and the 
recognition of the need to confront the discrimination, exclusion, and 
abuse experienced by these children. While acknowledging this hard-won 
transformation, “[m]any voices over the last decade have called for 
reform in special education in American public schools.”180  
As the number of students receiving services under the IDEA has 
grown, scholars, pundits, parents, attorneys, and others have increasingly 
criticized the educational system for failing to meet the needs of many 
children and even harming others.181 For example, minority children, 
especially African-American boys, are over-identified as disabled.182 
African-American boys are also disproportionately identified as mentally 
 
177. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 
89 Stat. 773 (1975); see also Education of the Handicapped Act 
Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103, 1141-42 (1990) 
(renaming the EAHCA as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA)).  
178. Martin et al., supra note 165, at 30 (citing President Gerald R. Ford, 
Statement on Signing the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 
1975 (Dec. 2, 1975)). 
179. Id. at 29. 
180. Hensel, supra note 151, at 291. 
181. Id. 
182. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(12)(B) (2006). Although 15 percent of students 
nationwide are African-American, African-American children comprise 20 
percent of the special education population. Rebecca Vallas, The 
Disproportionality Problem: The Overrepresentation of Black Students in 
Special Education and Recommendations for Reform, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 181, 184 (2009). But see Jonathan Feldman, Racial Perspectives on 
Eligibility for Special Education: For Students of Color Who Are 
Struggling, Is Special Education a Potential Evil or a Potential Good? 20 
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 183, 186-87, 190 (2011). Professor 
Feldman argues that that the disproportionality perspective is of limited 
utility and reflects a critique of institutionalized racism that was horrific 
and historically significant but not currently relevant to the needs of 
students, particularly in urban districts, where the vast majority of 
students are often students of color.  
Health Matrix·Volume 23·Issue 1·2013 
What Does Choice Really Mean? 
90 
retarded or emotionally disturbed compared to their white counterparts.183 
In sharp contrast, there is a parallel argument that in more affluent 
communities with majority white populations, special education is being 
inappropriately used to obtain academic advantages, especially for 
competitive college entrance examinations for those with milder disabilities 
like ADHD.184  
Another source of criticism is the emphasis that states and school 
districts place on procedural compliance to measure the success of 
special-needs children rather than looking to outcomes such as  
graduation, employment, and the level of independence in adult living 
situations.185 Another overarching challenge results from the continuing, 
and arguably unresolvable, tensions over what level of impairment 
justifies eligibility under the IDEA186 and whether inclusion versus access 
to specialized services should drive the design and implementation of 
special education polices.187  
 
183. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(12)(C) (2006).  
184. See Chester E. Finn et al., Conclusions and Principles for Reform, in 
RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEW CENTURY 30-31 (Chester E. 
Finn et al. eds., 2001). 
185. See generally Patrick J. Wolf & Bryan C. Hassel, Effectiveness and 
Accountability (Part 1): The Compliance Model, in RETHINKING SPECIAL 
EDUCATION FOR A NEW CENTURY 53, 53 (Chester E. Finn et al. eds., 2001) 
(discussing the existing model of compliance accountability in assessing the 
effectiveness of special education); Bryan C. Hassel & Patrick J. Wolf, 
Effectiveness and Accountability (Part 2): Alternatives to the Compliance 
Model, in RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEW CENTURY 309, 309 
(Chester E. Finn et al. eds., 2001) (proposing alternative ways to measure 
effectiveness of special education programs and incentive programs with a 
market-oriented focus intended to improve special education outcomes).  
186. See generally Mark C. Weber, The IDEA Eligibility Mess, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 
83, 102-22 (2009) (discussing the confusion over recent court cases that 
reached conflicting conclusions about how much adverse education impact 
the child’s disability must have and when children with emotional 
disabilities are eligible). 
187. See Ruth Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption: Thirty Years 
Later, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 789, 796 (2006) (challenging the integration 
presumption by arguing for some children the empirical literature 
demonstrates that it hinders the development of an appropriate 
individualized educational program as required by the IDEA). But see 
Mark C. Weber, A Nuanced Approach to the Disability Integration 
Presumption, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 174, 174-75 (2007 
(contending that the integration presumption should be the rule in absence 
of other evidence based on which party is arguing for or against the 
presumption; that separate classes should be used only when supplemental 
services cannot make general education work for a given child; and that 
services should be broadly defined to include such things as co-teaching by 
special education professionals, aide services, assistive technology, behavior 
intervention, and initiatives to prevent harassment and mistreatment by 
teachers and peers). 
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The more practical concern of funding the IDEA’s mandates has 
sparked considerable public and political discussion because of the extra 
costs for special education programs compared to regular education 
programs.188 When IDEA was enacted, the intent was to help states 
provide special education by funding a portion of the additional, or 
“excess,” costs of special education over the costs of general education 
programs.189 The original legislation set the maximum federal contribu-
tion at 40 percent of the estimated excess cost of educating children with 
disabilities. Despite this enactment, federal funding has historically 
provided only a small share of total expenditures on special education.190 
Most recently, the federal funding levels for special education have 
remained relatively flat since 2004, with the exception of a significant 
infusion of funds under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009.191 Although politicians are usually careful to avoid seeming 
opposed to the interests of schoolchildren with disabilities, Congress has 
never authorized full funding for the IDEA.192  
While full funding remains a central component of the political  
discourse on federal special education policies, debates increasingly 
reflect themes over the need to reform all sectors of public education.193 
These include arguments over the need to increase economic efficiencies, 
accountability, improve post-secondary school outcomes, and enhance 
 
188. The cost of special education compared to regular education is the subject 
of significant controversy and is extremely difficult to quantify. Costs and 
spending are dependent on many variables due to regional differences and 
differences in needs across disabilities. Moreover, states are not obligated to 
give detailed state and local breakdowns of special education spending to 
the federal government. See Laudan Aron & Pamela Loprest, Disability 
and the Education System, 22 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 97, 109-11 (2012) 
(providing an overview of the funding mechanism for IDEA and the 
controversies surrounding federal and state funding structures for special 
education programs). One of the most respected studies found that in the 
1999-2000 school year, schools spent 90 percent more on the average 
school-age special education student (including general and special 
education funding) than on the average general education student. See J.G. 
Chambers et al., Special Education Spending Estimates from 1969-2000, 18 
J. SPECIAL EDUCATION LEADERSHIP 5, 5-13 (2005). 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. (noting that the ARRA provided an additional $11.3 billion in grants to 
states under IDEA Part B in 2009). 
192. Id.  
193. Id. at 100 (“Significant influences include the standards-based reform 
movement, which led to and was then accelerated by the federal No Child 
Left Behind law of 2002; the school choice and public charter school 
movement; and the growing need for “alternative” schools and programs 
for students who for a variety of reasons are not succeeding in regular 
public schools.”). 
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parental choice.194 Privatization and deregulation are key tenets of 
neoliberal educational policies that have been embraced across the 
political spectrum.195 The argument that privatization of public education 
will result in systemic improvements for all children is premised on claims 
that the efficiencies of the marketplace will provide more effective services 
by removing unnecessary regulatory requirements and empowering parents 
by enhancing or guaranteeing choice.196 The use of choice as the primary 
justification for the privatization of special education becomes even more 
significant because of the role parents play in ensuring their children 
receive the benefits to which they are entitled under the IDEA, and the 
resulting limitations on access. Parents of children with disabilities, legal 
scholars, and attorneys have long recognized the double-edged  
consequences of private enforcement: while it has granted some parents 
greater choice, control, and power over their child’s education, private 
enforcement is unnecessarily adversarial and has created some of the 
greatest systemic inequities limiting access to educational benefits for 
many other children with disabilities.197  
B. Parents as Enforcers: The Privatization of “Rights” and the Illusion 
of Parents as Equal Members of the “Team” 
The stated purpose of the IDEA is to ensure that children with  
disabilities have available to them “a free appropriate public education 
that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet 
their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment 
and independent living.”198 The IDEA mandates that states’ local 
educational agencies (i.e., school districts)199 provide a free appropriate 
 
194. Id.  
195. See, e.g., ROMNEY: BELIEVE IN AMERICA, A CHANCE FOR EVERY CHILD: 
MITT ROMNEY’S PLAN FOR RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN 
EDUCATION 3-4, 5-9, 19-28 (2012) (delineating a federal K-12 education 
policy that emphasizes parental choice, charter schools, 
voucher/scholarships, and local control); see also David Stout, Obama 
Outlines Plan for Education Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2009, at A14. 
196. See Harrison, supra note 28 (providing an overview of the market approach 
to organizing elementary and secondary education systems).  
197. See Martin A. Kotler, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: A 
Parent’s Perspective and Proposal for Change, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
331, 341 (1994); Phillips, supra note 155, at 1828; see also Miriam Kurtzig 
Freedman, Special Education: Its Ethical Dilemmas, Entitlement Status, 
and Suggested Systemic Reforms, U. CHI. L. REV., 1, 7, 16-17, 20, 
https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/ 
uploads/79_1/Freedman.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). 
198. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
199. The statutory text references local education agencies (LEAs), which are 
defined to include school boards. § 1401(19)(A). 
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public education200 “tailored to the unique needs of the handicapped 
child by means of an ‘individualized educational program (IEP).’”201 An 
IEP must be a written document containing a specific statement of the 
child’s current performance levels, the child’s short-term and long-term 
goals, the proposed educational services, and criteria for evaluating the 
child’s progress.202 The school district must review the IEP annually to 
make necessary adjustments and revisions.203 Under IDEA, children with 
disabilities must be educated to the maximum extent appropriate with 
children without disabilities, and supplementary aids and services must 
be provided to prevent removal from regular classes.204 School districts 
must maintain and provide a continuum of placements ranging from 
placement in regular classes to restrictive placements such as home and 
hospital settings.205  
The Supreme Court’s analysis of “appropriate” in Board of  
Education v. Rowley206 continues to inform how that term and other key 
elements of the IDEA are understood. Rowley views special education law 
as procedural, not substantive, in nature and arguably dictates that the 
process by which the IEP is created is far more important than its 
content.207 In the words of dissenting Justice White, the Rowley court set 
a “basic floor of opportunity” for children “intended to eliminate the 
effects of the handicap, at least to the extent that the child will be given 
an equal opportunity to learn if that is reasonably possible.”208  
Educational progress, however, “must be ‘meaningful’ and not trivial or de 
minimis.”209 Rowley’s central holding was its establishment of a two-part 
 
200. § 1401(9) (“The term ‘free appropriate public education’ means special 
education and related services that (A) have been provided at public 
expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) 
meet the standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an 
appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in 
the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with the 
individualized education program required under section 1414(d) of this 
title.”).  
201. § 1414(d)(i)(A). 
202. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i). 
203. § 1414(d)(4)(A). 
204. § 1412(a)(5)(A). 
205. § 1412(a)(5). 
206. 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
207. Id. at 206.  
208. Id. at 215 (1982) (White, J., dissenting). 
209. Id. Rowley remains the Supreme Court’s sole pronouncement on the 
meaning of the public schools’ duty to provide appropriate education to 
children with disabilities as mandated by the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA) and its predecessors. Although the Court cautioned 
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test for assessing when a school district has violated the IDEA and a 
student and parents are entitled to redress.210 A reviewing court must ask 
two questions: “First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth 
in the Act [in developing the IEP]? And second, is the individualized 
educational program developed through the Act’s procedures reasonably 
calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits?”211  
The IDEA is unusual among education programs created under the 
framework of cooperative federalism and statutory provisions designed to 
facilitate the inclusion of people with disability in that it creates an 
individually enforceable entitlement right to services.212 The Rowley 
court remarked that “[p]arents and guardians will not lack ardor in 
seeking to ensure that handicapped children receive all of the benefits to 
which they are entitled under the Act.”213 Thus, the IDEA creates a host 
of private enforcement mechanisms that parents may use when seeking 
to challenge a substantive decision about their child’s IEP or the process 
by which it was developed, ranging from administrative hearings to 
lawsuits, as well as a system of public enforcement through federal and 
state agencies.214 The IDEA is not a means-tested program.215 Although 
states with higher numbers of poor children receive greater funding, 
resources under the statute are to be distributed equitably.216  
Despite its origins in disability rights advocacy and jurisprudence 
and the language of equality, the IDEA is less a civil rights statute and 
more a funding mechanism in the guise of a civil rights statute with the 
provision of a “guaranteed” entitlement for certain children. While it 
would never be acknowledged publicly, school districts have been able to 
 
that its decision was limited to facts similar to those before it, lower courts 
have applied Rowley’s interpretation of the law to almost all other special 
education disputes. Over thirty years after the decision, what was meant 
by “basic access” and “meaningful benefit” remains in dispute, and 
Rowley’s continued relevance for determining policy and guiding decisions 
made by lower courts is being questioned. See generally Andrea Kayne 
Kaufman & Evan Blewett, When Good Enough is No Longer Good 
Enough: How the High Stakes Nature of the No Child Left Behind Act 
Supplemented the Rowley Definition of a Free Appropriate Public 
Education, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 5 (2012).  
210. Id. at 206-07. 
211. Id.  
212. Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private 
Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1422 (2011) (describing the 
structural components of the IDEA and the Act’s private enforcement 
system).  
213. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 713-14.  
214. Pasachoff, supra note 212, at 1417. 
215. Id. 
216. Id.  
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exploit parents’ role as a fiscal gatekeeper and may base decisions about 
the allocation of resources on the socio-economic status of parents.217 The 
entitlement to public services is only guaranteed for children with 
parents able to access their own private resources to compete on behalf 
of their child for the limited public resources;218 indeed, the evidence 
suggests that children from wealthier families enforce their rights under 
the statute at higher rates than do children in poverty and with much 
greater ease and success.219 More importantly, this enforcement disparity 
has a negative effect on the ability of parents to exercise their procedural 
rights and also the amount and quality of services children in poverty 
actually receive.220 Beside difficulties securing and paying for counsel, 
parents also face additional challenges in seeking private enforcement 
under the IDEA. Not only do school districts have ready access to legal 
counsel, they have a stable of potential witnesses in the form of teachers, 
related service providers, and administrators. Moreover, in Arlington 
Central School District v. Murphy, the Supreme Court ruled that 
parents do not have the right to recover the costs of experts, witnesses 
or non-lawyer consultants hired in the course of litigation.221 These costs 
potentially compound other incurred costs for parents regardless of the 
merits or outcome of the case.  
Although enforcement of the IDEA is the source of compelling cases 
before the federal courts, litigation at both the administrative and 
federal court level is a very small part of the experience most parents 
 
217. Charles P. Fox, a Chicago area special education attorney and former 
director of the DePaul College of Law Special Education Advocacy Clinic, 
terms these practices “educational advocacy redlining.” Mr. Fox has 
observed that special education directors often use parents’ addresses and 
property tax rates to assess whether they have resources to mount a legal 
challenge against a school district. See Charles Fox, School District’s 
Gathering Information on Parents, SPECIAL EDUC. L. BLOG (Feb. 9, 2011, 
12:01 AM), http://blog.foxspecialedlaw.com/2011/02/page/2/; see also 
Valerie Leiter & Marty Wyngaarden Krauss, Claims, Barriers, and 
Satisfaction: Parents’ Requests for Additional Special Education Services, 
15 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 135, 143 (2004) (hypothesizing that families 
living in poverty could be more likely to report barriers to additional 
special education services because school personnel perceive them as not 
having the financial or time resources to contest schools’ refusals of 
additional services or reflect the limitations on funding in school districts 
with high poverty rates).  
218. Pasachoff, supra note 212, at 1424-34. 
219. Id. at 1426; see also Margaret M. Wakelin, Challenging Disparities in 
Special Education: Moving Parents from Disempowered Team Members to 
Ardent Advocates, 3 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 263, 277 (2008) (describing the 
difficulties parents face obtaining affordable legal representation in special 
education matters). 
220. Pasachoff, supra note 212, at 1426-28. 
221. 548 U.S. 291, 300 (2006). 
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have exercising their rights under the IDEA.222 The IEP process is the 
locus for the vast majority of interactions between public school district 
officials and parents of children with disabilities.223 While it is intended 
to be collaborative and “parent friendly,”224 the IEP process is a  
daunting and occasionally contentious process even for the most empow-
ered parents with ready access to traditional avenues of power and legal 
representation.225 Professor Daniela Caruso has described IEPs as being 
“as close to contracts as it gets in the realm of public services governed by 
federal law”226 and compares the IEP drafting process to the bargaining 
process involved in private party contractual dealings.227 Additionally, 
limitations on resources force families to compete for special education 
services just as qualified corporate entities may compete for affirmative 
action entitlements.228  
Olga Pribyl, Managing Attorney of the Special Education Clinic for 
Equip for Equality, Illinois’ Protection and Advocacy System, provides a 
telling description of the illusory nature of parental equality in the IEP 
process:  
Ask any attorney who has a child with special education needs what 
it is like to attend their own child’s Individualized Education Program 
(IEP) meeting. Most likely, they will reply that they had knots in 
their stomach, were nervous, felt out-numbered, and were completely 
intimidated. Yes, even your fellow experienced attorneys can be  
intimidated by a process that is intended to be “parent-friendly.”229 
 
222. See Perry A. Zirkel & Gina Scala, Due Process Hearing Systems Under the 
IDEA: A State-by-State Survey, 21 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 3, 4-5 (2010) 
(reporting 2,033 adjudicated hearings in 2008-2009 with four states (New 
York, California, New Jersey, Pennsylvania) and the District of Columbia 
accounting for 85 percent of the total adjudicated hearings). 
223. Cf. Muller, supra note 94, at 512. 
224. Olga Pribyl, Leveling the Playing Field: Helping Children with Special 
Education Needs, 23 CBA REC. 42, 42 (2009). 
225. Professor David Engel analyzed a 1988-1989 study that found that parents 
feel inadequate and unqualified in special education situations across 
socioeconomic and other demographic classes. The study is now over 
twenty years old, but these descriptions closely match the current culture 
and climate surrounding the IEP process. See David M. Engel, Law, 
Culture, and Children with Disabilities: Educational Rights and the 
Construction of Difference, DUKE L.J. 166, 188 (1991). 
226. Daniela Caruso, Bargaining and Distribution in Special Education, 14 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 177 (2005). 
227. Id. at 177. 
228. Id. 
229. Pribyl, supra note 224, at 42. 
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School districts may use tactics that depend on intimidation and 
discrepancies in power to shift responsibility to the family and force the 
use of private resources. Even parents who have a lengthy history of 
thoughtful involvement in their child’s education and school community 
are characterized as hostile or emotionally disturbed and seeking  
outlandish, unreasonable, and unnecessary services and placements at 
“taxpayer” expense. These arguments typically reflect both aggressive 
legal tactics and an effort to objectify the child with a disability into a 
commodity. School districts often appear to fail to—or sometimes 
consciously refuse to—consider that the IDEA expects parents to 
advocate for their children and also that parents of children with 
disabilities are most often taxpayers. School districts argue that the 
parents have taken a frivolous position and their attorneys should be 
sanctioned through fee-shifting provisions.230 Another tactic is to argue 
that parents are seeking a particular service or placement for their child 
because of their own pathology, denial, or guilt over their failure to act, 
which has caused or worsened their child’s condition231 or that the parent 
may even be causing their child harm by seeking services for a child who 
is actually flourishing.232 These arguments are used to diminish the 
power of a family’s legitimate claims that their child has been denied 
educational opportunities or to refute arguments that public responsibil-
 
230. Since the 2004 revision of the IDEA, school districts and states that prevail 
at due process hearings are able to recover attorneys’ fees against parents 
when the complaints are “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” 
See Jessica Butler-Arkow, The Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Improvement Act of 2004: Shifting School Districts’ Attorney’s Fees to 
Parents of Children with Disabilities and Counsel, 42 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 
527, 527-28 (2006) (providing an overview of the IDEA provisions involving 
fee shifting to parents and their counsel). Some commentators have argued 
that this addition to the provision may further discourage attorneys’ 
representation of parents in possibly worthy challenges under the IDEA. 
See, e.g., Wakelin, supra note 219, at 282. 
231. Cf. Charles Fox, Retaliation Against Parents for Advocating: An Emerging 
Trend, SPECIAL EDUC. L. BLOG (July 5, 2012, 12:45 PM), 
http://blog.foxspecialedlaw.com/2012/07/index.html (discussing the 
misperceptions of school districts when they equate parents  
who are anxious, exhausted, and very frightened as being difficult  
and angry); see generally Retaliation: A Primer and The Retaliation  
Triangle, WRIGHTSLAW (last updated Aug. 24, 2012), 
http://www.wrightslaw.com/info/retal.primer.htm (providing an overview 
of retaliatory practices engaged in by some school districts to scare parents 
and reduce their advocacy).  
232. See Jennifer Laviano, The Sudden Blossoming of the Represented  
Child, CONN. SPECIAL EDUC. LAW. (July 31, 2009), 
http://www.connecticutspecialeducationlawyer.com/blog/occasional-
rants/the-sudden-blossoming-of-the-represented-child (describing how 
school districts will present documentary evidence during IEP meetings 
that a child has “blossomed” and made significant educational and 
behavioral progress after a parent retains an attorney).  
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ity for a necessary and appropriate research-based educational interven-
tion for the child is a reasonable expectation.  
C. Private Remedies: The Real Focus of the IDEA and the Illusion of 
Public Responsibility for Children with Disabilities 
The preference for inclusion of children with disabilities in public 
schools is not an absolute mandate but a Congressional preference.233 The 
more exclusionary placements include separate classes and therapeutic 
schools, many of which are privately operated. When a public school 
district fails to provide a child with a disability an appropriate education, 
a parent may obtain tuition payment for the child to attend a private 
school under the IDEA as a remedy through an impartial hearing and/or 
judicial proceeding.234 Without doubt, placement of some children with 
disabilities in such schools is often a necessary intervention and the only 
way to address complex educational needs.235 Students placed in private 
schools represent a small fraction of special education students but have 
been scapegoated as the primary cause of escalating special education 
costs.236 Not only is this depiction unfair, it has allowed discussion to 
shift away from examining what the emphasis on these placements 
means in the provision of equitable public education services for children 
with disabilities. The emphasis in IDEA scholarship and jurisprudence 
on placements in privately run therapeutic programs reflects the ever-
deepening wealth inequities in the education of children with disabilities, 
and the shifting responsibility for children with disabilities from the 
public sector to the private realms of family and marketplace.237  
 
233. Roncker ex rel. Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(“The [IDEA] does not require mainstreaming in every case but its 
requirement that mainstreaming be provided to the maximum extent 
appropriate indicates a very strong congressional preference.”). 
234. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i-ii) (2006).  
235. See Ruth Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption: Thirty Years 
Later, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 789, 825 (2006). 
236. See Jay P. Greene & Marcus A. Winters, Debunking a Special Education 
Myth: Don’t Blame Private Options for Rising Costs, 67 EDUC. NEXT 67, 
68, 70 (2007). A review of US Department of Education data suggests that 
Professor Greene and Mr. Winters’ statements regarding the numbers and 
percentages of students in private placements has remained constant.  
See Data Tables for OSEP State Reported Data: Part B Educational 
Environment (2009), DATA ACCOUNTABILITY CTR., http://www.idea 
data.org/arc_toc11.asp#partbLRE (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).  
237. The importance of the private tuition remedy is evidenced by the fact that 
even in cases before the Supreme Court that address procedural issues 
under the IDEA, the underlying issue is most often placement of the child 
in a private therapeutic school and parents’ rights reimbursement under 
the IDEA. See, e.g., Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. 
Dist., 550 U.S. 518, 533 (2007) (holding that “IDEA grants parents 
independent, enforceable rights. These rights, which are not limited to 
certain procedural and reimbursement-related matters, encompass the 
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Despite the underlying purpose of the IDEA, the language of the 
statute and the decisions are framed in terms of “reimbursement.”238 
This raises the question whether families who cannot afford to pay 
tuition and the legal fees necessary to seek reimbursement can really 
avail themselves of this remedy.239 Along with high tuition fees and costs 
for transportation (or in the case of residential placements, room and 
board), private schools may require application fee deposits, long-term 
contracts, or have exclusionary admissions.240 This remedy results in a 
tacit creation of a means test for a statute that is explicitly intended to 
provide for an entitlement to all considered qualified through disability. 
Those who have the private resources to provide for a child with a 
disability can, but others are excluded from exercising a fundamental 
right, thus reinforcing inequities.241 
In School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education,242 
the Supreme Court, while finding that this was part of the IDEA’s 
procedural safeguards, explicitly acknowledged that this remedy was 
available to parents of “adequate means:”  
[T]he parents who disagree with the proposed IEP are faced with a 
choice: go along with the IEP to the detriment of their child if it 
turns out to be inappropriate or pay for what they consider to be 
the appropriate placement. If they choose the latter course, which 
conscientious parents who have adequate means and who are  
reasonably confident of their assessment normally would, it would 
be an empty victory to tell them several years later that they were 
right but that these expenditures could not in a proper case be  
reimbursed by the school officials. If that were the case, the child’s 
right to a free appropriate public education, the parents’ right to 
 
entitlement to a free appropriate public education for the parents’ child.”). 
Although this is an expansive reading of the statute and clearly indicates 
the importance of the entire bundle of procedural rights, the importance of 
reimbursement is inescapable. See also Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 
(2005). 
238. Elisa Hyman et al., How IDEA Fails Families Without Means: Causes and 
Corrections from the Frontlines of Special Education Lawyering, 20 AM. U. 
J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 107, 122 (2011). 
239. Id. See Lorraine Forte, Ensuring Equity for Children Who Have Special 
Needs, CATALYST IN DEPTH, Spring 2012, at 2, 2. 
240. Hyman et al., supra note 238, at 112, 121, 126 (discussing how the IDEA’s 
private school tuition remedy constitutes an inherent structural bias that 
disproportionately benefits wealthy families).  
241. Id. 
242. 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985). 
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participate fully in developing the proper IEP, and all of the  
procedural safeguards would be less than complete.243 
In 1997, the IDEA was amended and the right to tuition reimburse-
ment for private placements was expressly codified in the statute 
entitled “Payment for education of children enrolled in private schools 
without consent of or referral by the public agency.”244 Ten years later, 
the Court again considered issues related to private placements in Board 
of Education v. Tom F.,245 which raised the question of whether the 
IDEA entitles parents to reimbursement for their child’s private school 
education if the child has never received special education services 
provided by a public school.246 The Court considered the question again 
in 2009 in Forest Grove School District v. T.A.,247 holding that Burling-
ton and Carter authorized reimbursement where a free appropriate 
public education was not provided, “without regard to the child’s prior 
receipt of services.”248 Despite this finding, courts and impartial hearing 
officers/administrative law judges often still seek evidence that a child 
has made progress in the private placement before finding that  
placement is appropriate.249 “[N]o circuit court has ruled on the specific 
question of tuition relief for poor families; and, if decisions in other 
contexts can be read as barometers, the circuits would likely be split on 
this question.”250 Arguably, reimbursement of private school tuition 
under the IDEA is available to parents that manage to place their child 
in a private school that does not require tuition payments because the 
school has concluded that the parents’ likelihood of success on the merits 
 
243. Id. at 370 (emphasis added). 
244. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2006).  
245. 552 U.S 1 (2007).  
246. The case resulted in a 4-4, two-sentence per curiam non-precedential 
decision affirming the Second Circuit’s grant of reimbursement to parents. 
The original administrative matter involved payment of $21,819 for a 
student’s private school tuition. The parent had recently resigned as the 
President and Chief Executive Officer of Viacom Inc., and was awarded an 
$85 million severance package. He told interviewers he insisted on 
appearing as an anonymous litigant to avoid publicity for both himself and 
his son but that he litigated the case for potential precedential value and 
to address an unfairness for other parents who could not afford the costs of 
private education for their child with special needs. See John Sullivan, New 
York City Loses Special Education Appeal, CITY ROOM, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
10, 2007, 12:48 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/10/new-
york-city-loses-special-education-appeal/.  
247. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 233 (2009). 
248. Id. at 243. 
249. Hyman et al., supra note 238, at 123-25. 
250. Id. at 124. 
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is high.251 Some parents have been granted this relief in administrative 
hearings and by a court.252 But there is no current uniform approach 
among the circuits regarding this issue, and whether it is possible for all 
families with limited financial resources to have equal access to the 
remedy of private school tuition remains uncertain.253 
As the Supreme Court stated in Winkelman v. Parma City School 
District, “we find nothing in the statute to indicate that when Congress 
required States to provide adequate instruction to a child ‘at no cost to 
parents,’ it intended that only some parents would be able to enforce 
that mandate.”254 Arguably, denial of the right of tuition to low-income 
parents may be construed as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
because it denies access to an appropriate education for one class of 
eligible individuals while providing the right to another class. Sustaining 
this argument is highly improbable either under a strict scrutiny or 
rational basis standard.255 Changing the inequality will likely require an 
amendment to the IDEA or an almost revolutionary rejection of the 
Supreme Court’s formulation that parents who unilaterally place their 
child with a disability in a private therapeutic school do so “at their own 
financial risk.”256 This is unlikely in the current political climate, with its 
increasing emphasis on private responsibilities and resources in  
addressing the educational needs of children with disabilities.257 
D. Vouchers and Charter Schools: The Illusion of Choice and the 
Ultimate Privatization of Public Education 
 
The involvement of the private sector in public K-12 education is 
not new.258 Entire industries have long served public schools through 
textbook and supply companies, bus and custodial services, and food 
 
251. Id. at 126. 
252. Id.  
253. Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 533 
(2007) (quoting Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C.  
§ 1400(d)(1)(B) (2006)).  
254. Id. at 533. 
255. See Katie Harrison, Direct Tuition Payments Under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act: Equal Remedies for Equal Harm, 25 J. CIV. 
RTS. & ECON. DEV. 873, 895-902 (2011) (analyzing the constitutional 
implications of precluding low-income parents from the unilateral 
placement remedy). 
256. Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 373-74 (1985). 
257. See Harrison, supra note 255, at 902-07. 
258. WILLIAM J. MATHIS & LORNA JIMERSON, A GUIDE TO CONTRACTING OUT 
SCHOOL SUPPORT SERVICES: GOOD FOR THE SCHOOL? GOOD FOR THE 
COMMUNITY? 7-8 (2008). 
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service providers.259 An extensive number of private day and residential 
schools have educated children with disabilities after receiving tuition 
payments from public school systems or other public agencies.260  
Outsourcing has grown to include contracts with companies to provide 
services like speech, language, occupational, and physical therapies and 
nursing services within public schools—activities traditionally conducted 
by professionals working directly for the school district.261 This change 
has made true privatization of public education for all children,  
including children with disabilities, more acceptable. There are long-
standing concerns about the lack of quality control and evidence of the 
potential for abuse and even criminal corruption when school systems 
vest control of special education to the private sector.262 Yet it is unlikely 
that the trend toward privatization of the education of children with 
disabilities will be slowed.263 
1. Vouchers  
Privatization has resulted from two-interrelated movements gathered 
under the banner of “choice:” the voucher movement and the charter 
school movement.264 The concept of special education vouchers is simple: 
they are taxpayer-funded payments made to a parent or an educational 
institution for any eligible child who obtains a voucher that can be used 
to pay for the tuition at a private school.265 Since the Supreme Court’s 
 
259. Stephanie Simon, Privatizing Public Schools: Big Firms Eyeing Profits 
From U.S. K-12 Market, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 2, 2012, 10:16 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/02/private-firms-eyeing-
prof_n_1732856.html. 
260. MATHIS & JIMERSON, supra note 258, at 8; see also Association Policies & 
Procedures, NAT’L ASS’N OF PRIVATE SPECIAL EDUC. CENTERS, 
http://www.napsec.org/strategicplan.html#WhatIs (last visited Feb. 21, 
2013). 
261. Ron Schachter, Seeking Savings in Special Ed: Accelerating Costs Are 
Driving Some Districts to Outsource These Services, DIST. ADMIN., Jan. 1, 
2012, at 35. 
262. See e.g., David M. Halbfinger, Companies Shortchanged Preschool Special 
Education, State Audits Find, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2012, at A14; David 
M. Halbfinger, Preschool Special Education Trade Group Calls for More 
Audits and Penalities, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2012, at A20. 
263. Cf. Martha Minow, Confronting the Seduction of Choice: Law, Education, 
and American Pluralism, 120 YALE L.J. 814, 847 (2011) (“Our laws have 
made school choice a force, thus influencing the worlds of families, nations, 
cultures, religions, genders, sexualities, disabilities, and even the narratives 
we tell about what we want for the next generation.”).  
264. Martha Minow, Reforming School Reform, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 257, 258 
(1999). 
265. Hensel, supra note 151, at 292. See also Curt Dudley-Marling & Diana 
Baker, The Effects of Market-Based School Reforms on Students with 
Disabilities, DISABILITY STUDIES Q., Vol. 32, No. 2 (2012).  
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decisions in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris266 and Arizona Christian School 
Tuition Organization v. Winn267 that rejected challenges to voucher 
programs as violating the Establishment Clause, the role of the voucher 
movement as a significant part of the debate over educational reform has 
been assured.  
As of August 2012, there were thirty-two “private school choice  
programs” in the United States.268 Sixteen of these programs are school 
voucher programs, and fourteen are scholarship tax programs.269 It is 
estimated that about 30,000 students with disabilities use vouchers to 
attend private schools, although it is unclear whether the vouchers are 
being used primarily for therapeutic schools or private schools where 
students may be integrated with those without disabilities.270 There is no 
question that the provision of private school vouchers is controversial; 
many politicians even use the term “scholarship” to describe voucher 
programs.271 There is no clear consensus among disability and parent 
groups regarding special needs tuition vouchers. The debate continues 
over whether such programs enhance parental choice over children’s 
educations and provide a step forward for children with disabilities, or 
whether vouchers represent a renunciation of the public’s obligation to 
provide a free appropriate public education and will ultimately result in 
the return of the widespread exclusion of children with disabilities from 
public schools.  
 
266. 536 U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002) (holding that the Cleveland Pilot Project 
Scholarship program did not violate the Establishment Clause because it is 
“entirely neutral with respect to religion” and “provides benefits [] to a 
wide spectrum of individuals, defined only by financial need and residence 
in a particular school district” and therefore is a “program of true private 
choice”).  
267. 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1440 (2011) (holding that a group of Arizona taxpayers 
did not have standing to challenge a state law that provides tax credits to 
people who donate to school tuition organizations that in turn provide 
scholarships to students who want to attend private or religious schools 
because any damages or harm claimed by the taxpayers by virtue of simply 
being a taxpayer would be pure speculation because the issue at hand was 
a tax credit and not a government expenditure).  
268. See School Choice Programs in America: The Facts, ALLIANCE FOR 
SCHOOL CHOICE, http://www.allianceforschoolchoice.org/school-choice-
programs-in-america-the-facts (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).  
269. Id. 
270. Nirvi Shah, 30,000 Students with Disabilities Use Private School Vouchers, 
EDUCATION WEEK (Apr. 5, 2012, 9:08 AM), 
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/speced/2012/04/30000_students_ 
with_disabiliti.html.  
271. Sarah Carr, School Vouchers Make a Comeback, Stir Concerns About 
Quality, THE HECHINGER REPORT (Aug. 21, 2012, 11:07 AM), 
http://hechingerreport.org/content/school-vouchers-make-a-comeback-stir-
concerns-about-quality_9285/.  
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The application of free market models to contemporary school  
reform originated with economist Milton Friedman over a half-century 
ago. Professor Friedman advocated for a publicly financed, free-market 
school choice model that provided parents with cash vouchers to select 
among schools operated by for-profit or non-profit companies.272 During 
the 1980s and early 1990s, interest in neo-liberal, free-market-oriented 
school reform resurfaced as a means to address failing schools in urban 
areas.273 The general argument for school voucher programs was “that a 
graduated or calibrated voucher system, diverting funds complementary 
to the income needs of the family, would create an incentive for private 
schools and high-quality suburban public schools to recruit low-income 
students.”274  
Advocates of voucher programs for children with disabilities argue 
that they will cure most of the systemic inadequacies and inequities that 
plague public schools’ provision of special education under the IDEA. 
They claim that the increased competition for students with disabilities 
resulting from the involvement of the private sector offers a superior 
approach to traditional reform efforts to address the limited resources, 
indifference, and lack of meaningful progress that children with disabilities 
experience in the public schools, and that competition ultimately will 
benefit students who remain in public schools.275 Voucher advocates have 
also asserted that market forces create incentives for school districts to 
avoid the unnecessary over-identification of students with disabilities and 
thereby save taxpayers money.276  
Proponents of vouchers also claim that they eliminate the disparities 
between parents’ abilities to access private therapeutic school placements 
by eliminating the inherent uncertainty of litigation and the financial 
 
272. See generally Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in 
ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 123, 143-44 (Robert A. Solo ed., 
1955) (arguing the most effective means of reforming American education 
is to expose schools to the competitive forces of the free market and 
limiting the state’s role in education to ensure that schools meet minimum 
standards). 
273. See generally JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, & 
AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 10-11 (1990) (arguing that opening up educational 
markets to competition was a necessary and sufficient condition for 
reforming American schools and that the notion of choice is a panacea).  
274. William N. Myhill, No FAPE for Children with Disabilities in the 
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program: Time to Redefine a Free Appropriate 
Public Education, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1051, 1062 (2004). 
275. Hensel, supra note 151, at 292, 294. 
276. Jay P. Greene & Stuart Buck, The Case for Special Education Vouchers, 
EDUCATION NEXT, Winter 2010, at 36, 41. It is important to note that this 
argument fails to consider the multifactorial social, public policy and 
scientific reasons that have likely contributed to the increase in students 
identified with disabilities. 
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and psychological toll of suing the same people charged with teaching 
their children.277 More dramatically, supporters contend voucher  
programs remove the inequities caused by the IDEA’s reliance on private 
enforcement and democratize access to private placements by reducing 
legal and financial barriers created by the hearing process when parents 
are seeking a private therapeutic placement.278 Supporters argue that the 
rights of parents are seemingly identical under IDEA and under special 
education voucher laws, but the ease with which parents can exercise 
those rights is profoundly different because of the power of market forces 
and the inadequacy of the legal system.279 
The claim of greater accountability for outcomes and identical  
protection or even greater rights is made despite acknowledging that 
parents have no legal right to specific services from private schools280 and 
the fact that the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights 
(OCR) has repeatedly opined that students with disabilities who 
voluntarily participate in voucher programs waive most of their rights 
under the IDEA.281 The only enforceable individual right that remains is 
the right to complain about the local school district’s failure to identify, 
locate and evaluate students with disabilities—not to complain about 
the failure to provide appropriate related services. 
The OCR has determined that private schools participating in  
voucher programs do not become state contractors when they accept state 
funds because parents are the decision-makers and local educational 
authorities are not involved in the decision to place children.282 More 
importantly, nothing in Section 504 or the ADA mandates that children in 
private schools be provided with an IEP or the other entitlements  
designed to ensure meaningful educational benefit or receive differentiated 
programming and related services.283 Therefore, when parents of children 
 
277. Id. at 41. 
278. Id.  
279. Id. But see Hensel, supra note 151, at 331 (discussing the limited value of 
the threat of transferring a child back to public school).  
280. Hensel, supra note 151, at 321. 
281. Richard D. Komer, OCR Staff Memorandum, 22 INDIVIDUALS WITH 
DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 669, 669 (1990); Letter from Susan Bowers, 
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights,  
& Patricia J. Guard, Acting Director, U.S. Dep’t of Ed., to John W. 
Bowen, School Board Attorney, Pinellas County School Board (Mar. 30, 
2001), available at http://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/ 
letters/2001-1/bowen3302001fape.pdf (stating that students placed through 
Florida’s Opportunity Scholarship Program are considered “private school 
children with disabilities” with no individual entitlement to FAPE or 
related services under the IDEA). 
282. Komer, supra note 281, at 670, 672. 
283. See Hensel, supra note 151, at 321-330. 
Health Matrix·Volume 23·Issue 1·2013 
What Does Choice Really Mean? 
106 
with disabilities choose to accept a voucher and place the child in a 
private school, they have effectively waived meaningful protection under 
federal civil law of their child’s rights to access an education.284 
“From the viewpoint of parents stuck in incompetent districts,  
financially unable to pay tuition, and faced with the awful prospect of 
seeing their children doomed to poor functioning for lack of early 
intervention, school choice may be the only hope and is a sacrosanct 
advocacy goal. But from a broader societal perspective, developing 
publicly funded, state-of-the-art special education programs remains a 
far more desirable option—one that vouchers and scholarships inevitably 
undermine.”285 The argument that vouchers provide choices that result in 
meaningful educational benefits for individual children and hold the 
promise to resolve the systemic inequities that have plagued special 
education necessitates consideration of whether these choices are real, or 
merely illusory promises designed to promote free-market school reform 
ideology. The essential question is whether the educational outcomes of 
children with disabilities educated in private schools paid for by  
vouchers justify the waiver of the rights guaranteed by the IDEA. 286  
While there is evidence that voucher programs can benefit children 
with less severe disabilities,287 the evidence points to overall negative 
implications for the development and provisions of special education 
programs for children most in need of specialized instruction and related 
services.  Students with mild disabilities such as learning disabilities, 
attention deficit disorder, and mild speech and language disorders may 
only require a small learning environment or interventions that can  
be provided by any reasonably competent educator with adequate 
instructional resources, the opportunity to respond to differentiate 
instruction, and administrative support.288 The exodus of students with 
milder disabilities from the public school system may also result in the 
redistribution of funds to the private sector and lessen collaboration 
among parents of children with disabilities. This is because parents of 
students with varying levels of impairment would be forced to compete for 
 
284. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY LIVING, SCHOOL VOUCHERS AND 
STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES (2003). 
285. Caruso, supra note 84, at 523. 
286. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY LIVING, supra note 284 (“The principle 
of school choice, and voucher programs in particular, have not been 
adequately shown to be internally consistent and mutually reinforcing with 
regard to the other three principles of IDEA reauthorization 
(accountability for results, increasing local flexibility, and a focus on what 
works) outlined by the U.S. Department of Education . . . .”). 
287. Hensel, supra note 151, at 337. 
288. Cf. id. at 323, 336 (discussing the needs of children with mild learning 
disabilities, comparing the demands created by students with mild, 
moderate, and severe impairments and the potential impact of diminished 
public resources to educate children with severe disabilities). 
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the increasingly scarce resources designated for the actual provision of 
direct therapeutic services.289  
The effectiveness of voucher programs in addressing the needs of  
children with more severe disabilities has not been demonstrated by a 
study of objective measures of student progress in academic subjects or 
basic skill development.290 Such students require highly specialized 
instruction and services necessitating the involvement of specially trained 
and certified therapists and nursing services or the availability of assistive 
technology for communication, mobility, and other needs. Paradoxically, 
they are the same students who are most often depicted as the “poster 
children” for the voucher movement because it is politically treacherous to 
argue for a position that may be construed as antithetical to the interests 
of children with disabilities.291 The lack of persuasive evidence that 
voucher programs result in meaningful educational outcomes and  
indications that they may actually disadvantage children with severe 
disabilities raises questions about the continued availability of appropriate 
public resources to provide for these children’s educational needs. As 
Professor Hensel has argued, 
 
289. The IDEA requires school districts to apportion IDEA Part-B dollars to 
provide for special education and related services to private school students 
with disabilities with the amount proportionate to the number of children 
with disabilities enrolled in private schools in the districts. 20 U.S.C § 
1412(a)(3)(A) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.131(a) (2012). This is not an 
individual entitlement for services but the delineation of the local 
educational authority to identify, locate and evaluate students with 
disabilities and to engage in meaningful consultation. “There is no 
individual entitlement to services at all . . . . There are no hearing rights to 
challenge decisions to give or withhold services.” Mark C. Weber, Services 
for Private School Students Under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Improvement Act: Issues for Statutory Entitlement, Religious 
Liberty, and Procedural Regularity, 36 J.L. & EDUC. 163, 205 (2007). 
290. Compare Hensel, supra note 151, at 328-30 (discussing lack of objective 
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superiority of a private education for students with disabilities), with JAY 
P. GREENE & MARCUS WINTERS, MANHATTAN INSTITUTE FOR POLICY 
RESEARCH, THE EFFECT OF SPECIAL EDUCATION VOUCHERS ON PUBLIC 
SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM FLORIDA’S MCKAY SCHOLARSHIP 
PROGRAM (2008). See also Dudey-Marling & Baker, supra note 265 
(“[S]ince the private schools accepting the vouchers are exempt from state 
and federal accountability requirements, data on the academic achievement 
of special education students who attend voucher schools in Florida are 
unavailable; therefore, the quality of education for students with 
disabilities who use vouchers to attend private schools in the state is 
largely unknown.” (citation omitted)). 
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[t]he wide-spread dissatisfaction with the status quo for students with 
disabilities is not a simple result of the public schools’ inability to 
meet the needs of these children. Instead, to a large extent, it is a 
product of the public’s unwillingness to make meeting the needs of 
such students a priority. Legislators would be better served by looking 
to programs that help all students with disabilities achieve their  
academic potential rather than focusing on benefits for only a few.292  
Supporters of vouchers may also wish to consider the inherent contradic-
tion of predicating access to the marketplace of such reforms and 
“choices” on the waiver of the basic protections for children with 
disabilities under the IDEA. 
2. Charter Schools 
While vouchers are a perennial favorite cause among conservative 
critics of public schools, the charter school movement has been embraced 
by many parents, politicians, social critics, philanthropists, business 
leaders, and other self-styled education reformers from an array of 
political persuasions. Charter schools are frequently at the epicenter of 
the debates over American public school reform, with new controversies 
emerging almost every day.293  
“Charter schools are the ‘kudzu of school choice’ and their spread is 
inevitable.”294 Their proliferation has also been facilitated by the  
dominant place they are given in federal education legislation and grant 
programs.295 In some cities, charter schools have become the cornerstone 
of school reform. In post-Katrina New Orleans, for example, charter 
schools are the foundation for the entire school system.296 Despite their 
spread and prominence in educational reform efforts, there is little 
evidence that charter schools have resulted in improvements in public 
schools or equitable educational choices. The evidence suggests that the 
proliferation of charter schools is actually constricting the choices 
 
292. Hensel, supra note 151, at 349. 
293. At the time this Article was being prepared for publication, school reform 
and the expansion of charter schools were a frequent topic of debate in the 
presidential election and an issue in the strike by the Chicago Teachers 
Union against the Chicago Public Schools. See, e.g., Monica Davey, 
Teachers’ Strike in Chicago Tests Mayor and Union, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 
2012, at A1.  
294. Robert A. Garda, Jr., Culture Clash: Special Education in Charter Schools, 
90 N.C. L. REV. 655, 657 (2012).  
295. Id. at 658. See also KATHLEEN B. BOUNDY, COUNCIL OF PARENT 
ATTORNEYS AND ADVOCATES, CHARTER SCHOOLS AND STUDENTS WITH 
DISABILITIES: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL ISSUES AND AREAS OF 
CONCERN 6-7 (2012). 
296. Robert A. Garda, Jr., The Politics of Education Reform: Lessons from 
New Orleans, 40 J.L. & EDUC. 57 (2011). 
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available to families of children with disabilities and may ultimately 
result in widespread limitations on services and do little to improve 
outcomes. There is clear evidence demonstrating that charter schools 
seek to limit the enrollment of children who require expensive or time-
consuming special education interventions. More importantly, evidence 
demonstrates that even those children enrolled in charter schools are 
being denied adequate services and that services for the children with 
disabilities left in traditional public schools may be placed at risk by the 
diversion of funding resources to charter schools.  
Charter schools function as quasi-market schools and are distinguished 
from traditional public schools by their autonomy from state and local 
educational authorities in governance, teacher hiring, budget, curriculum, 
and a range of school policies pertaining to administration and operations.297 
The management and operational structures of charters vary from for-profit 
educational management organizations to nonprofit entities including 
universities, religious organizations, and community groups.298 Because they 
are publicly funded schools, they must comply with federal laws concerning 
the rights of students with disabilities under the IDEA, Section 504, and the 
ADA.299  
The National Alliance for Public Charter Schools reported that in 
2011-2012, 4.2 percent of America’s public school children attended 
charter schools.300 The Government Accounting Office found that in 
2009-2010, the most recent data available at the time of its review, 
approximately eleven percent of students enrolled in traditional public 
schools were students with disabilities, compared to about 8 percent of 
 
297. See generally BOUNDY, supra note 295, at 8-12 (describing the various 
structures of charters and the legal relationships between charters and local 
and state education authorities). 
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educational authorities is beyond the scope of this Article, which seeks to 
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available for families of children with disabilities for this information. See 
generally Kathleen Conn, For-Profit School Management Corporations: 
Serving the Wrong Master, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 129, 137-142 (2002) (providing 
an overview of for-profit and nonprofit organizations of charter schools); 
Alexandria Barkmeier, Special Education Compliance and Charter Schools: 
A Study of National, State, and Local Policy in Denver Public Schools, 19 
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 283, 285-87 (2012).  
299. Robert A. Garda, Jr., Disabled Students’ Rights of Access to Charter 
Schools Under the IDEA, Section 504 and the ADA 2 (June 1, 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
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SCHS., http://dashboard.publiccharters.org/dashboard/students/page/over 
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students enrolled in charter schools.301 With regard to the effectiveness of 
charter schools, the evidence is inconclusive as to whether both regular 
education and special education charter students truly obtain meaningful 
measurable levels of academic achievement compared to students at 
traditionally organized public schools. The evidence suggests that the 
quality and performance of charter schools varies significantly from state 
to state.302 While the same can be said of American education in general, 
charter schools’ expansion into forty states, the District of Columbia, 
and Puerto Rico and their favored political position makes nationwide 
outcomes fair game for determining the validity of the claims that 
charter school supporters frequently make about both general and special 
education students and the importance of school choice for their  
families.303 
A longstanding criticism of charters schools is their lack of inclusion 
of racial minorities and students with disabilities. Critics argue that 
rather than improving the overall quality of public education, charters 
create a two-tiered balkanized education system with different resources 
that cater to different populations.  The concern regarding students with 
disabilities is that large urban school systems will become increasingly 
segregated, with more disabled students left in traditional public schools 
with dwindling resources due to shrinking student populations and 
students with less complex disabilities attending charter schools.304 While 
the issues of funding disparities are beyond the scope of this Article, the 
resulting limitations on the educational choices available to families of 
children with disabilities and the expectation that families assume 
responsibility for services that were previously the province of the public 
schools must be considered in this discussion of school choice and 
students with disabilities.  
A recent RAND Corporation study found that students in public 
schools have achievement levels that are comparable to their peers who 
enter charter schools. This finding refutes a frequent criticism that the 
proliferation of charter schools in urban and minority communities 
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2010) (concluding that charter school student achievement demonstrate 
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results in the exodus of the best students from traditional public schools. 
However, other studies demonstrate that school choice tends to  
advantage students who may not necessarily have stronger academic 
histories but come from families better equipped to participate in the 
application process to exercise school “choice.”305 Research suggests that 
families’ access to the “educational marketplace” is unequally  
constrained by such factors as connection with social media or other 
influential networks through which knowledge about particular school 
choices and the process is shared. The same research also suggests that 
language barriers, socioeconomic status, and the ability of parents to 
arrange transportation for their school-age children contributes to the 
ability of a family to access charter schools.306 This data may also 
indicate that families of children with disabilities are more easily 
excluded from the charter schools because of intensified challenges 
families face while advocating for a change in a child’s placement in the 
IEP process. 
A study of charter schools in thirteen states by the Government  
Accounting Office (GAO) released in June 2012 found that charter 
schools enrolled a lower percentage of students with disabilities than 
traditional public schools in both school years 2008-2009 and  
2009-2010.307 The GAO documented that in six states, charter schools 
enrolled a higher proportion of disabled students than traditional public 
schools. But this may not reflect equal access: schools where more than 
20 percent of the students had disabilities were more likely to be charter 
schools, in part because those schools cater specifically to students with 
special needs like autism.308 Charter schools struggle to enroll and 
appropriately serve students with disabilities such as mental retardation; 
serious emotional disturbance; autism; and hearing, speech, language, or 
orthopedic or visual impairments.309 The charter schools in large urban 
districts tend to enroll disproportionately greater numbers of students 
with high-incidence disabilities such as specific learning disabilities and 
lower numbers of students with low-incidence, more significant disabili-
ties (e.g., intellectual disabilities and autism) and more educationally 
intensive and costly needs.310 “For example, during the 2005-2006 school 
year, there were only three children with intellectual disabilities in all 
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San Diego non-conversion charter schools combined.”311 In comparison, 
traditional schools in the same district educated almost one thousand 
students with intellectual disabilities.312  
The GAO suggested several possible reasons for the overall disparity. 
Some parents choose public schools that have more established programs 
for students with disabilities, while some charter schools do not have the 
resources or teaching staff to support individual students’ needs.313 But 
in some cases, school administrators tacitly acknowledged that some 
charter schools may be discouraging students with disabilities from 
enrolling and denying admission to students with more severe disabilities 
to prevent lowering overall test scores or to avoid the costs associated 
with educating these students.314 Other accounts indicate that charter 
schools “push out” students with disabilities who cannot conform to the 
charter school’s strategies or rigid disciplinary code for reasons related to 
their disability and not willful misconduct.315  
The GAO also found a variety of other factors that resulted in lower 
enrollment, including some that result from efforts to circumvent the 
procedural requirements and protections of the IDEA.316 A survey 
evaluating special education programs and services of twenty-three 
charter schools in New Orleans found “an astonishing number of 504 
plans.”317 “[S]everal of the surveyed special education coordinators 
acknowledged that the Section 504 plans were developed to avoid 
referring students for special education evaluations.”318  The findings of 
the GAO study regarding systemic exclusion of students with disabilities 
and violations of the IDEA are echoed in the allegations made in a 
pending complaint filed by the Bazelon Center with the DOJ alleging 
that charter schools in Washington, D.C., illegally require parents to 
disclose information about students’ disabilities to screen out applicants 
with serious disabilities, advise parents that the school cannot or will not 
meet a student’s needs, and segregate students with disabilities in two 
overly restrictive schools.  A federal class action suit on behalf of all New 
Orleans students with special needs is also currently pending against the 
Louisiana Department of Education, the Board of Elementary and 
Secondary Education, and state superintendent Paul Pastorek.319 The 
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suit alleges that the defendants have (1) denied students with disabilities 
the same variety of educational programs and services available to non-
disabled students in violation of Section 504; (2) failed to locate,  
identify, and evaluate students in need of special education services in a 
timely fashion; (3) failed to provide a free and appropriate public 
education; and (4) unlawfully disciplined and excluded students with 
disabilities from educational programs in contravention of the IDEA.320 
The reasons for failure to serve students reflect both the continuing 
struggles all schools face educating students with complex disabilities 
and also issues unique to charter schools. Because of their autonomous 
structures, charter schools may be isolated or fail to develop systems 
that allow for the “economies of scale” for the recruitment of teachers 
and the development of resources necessary to serve students with 
disabilities.321 These arrangements result in the same kind of delays and 
lack of quality assurance that have fueled dissatisfaction with the public 
school system. They also reflect the systemic inequities in school funding 
that affect the provision of K-12 public education throughout the United 
States.322 Some states provide a higher level of funding for special 
education based on the severity of a student’s disability, making it more 
feasible financially for charter schools in those states to serve students 
with more severe disabilities.323 In contrast, other states do not take such 
factors into consideration when providing funding for special education. 
This shifts the responsibility of school districts and places financial 
burden on individual charter schools. The resulting limitation on service 
may ultimately create an expectation that parents of children with 
disabilities turn to private resources to ensure their child receives the 
educational services that under the IDEA should be provided by the 
public schools.324  
Although several thoughtful proposals have been made about how to 
address these problems, too little attention is being given to finding 
actual solutions.325 The wide-scale avoidance of responsibility resulting in 
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“pushing out” of students with disabilities from charter schools or the 
failure to provide services for the students left in them will likely result 
in pressure on families to obtain resources outside of the school system. 
Such a result represents merely a shifting of problems from the public to 
private sector without addressing the fundamental issues of ensuring 
meaningful educational outcomes for children with disabilities.  
When the IDEA was reauthorized in 2004, increasing parental choice 
was one of the hallmarks of what was touted as a new era of accounta-
bility and improved educational outcomes for children with disabilities 
through the promise of reforms made possible by the involvement of the 
private sector in public education. “If a significant fraction of students—
those with disabilities—are kept from having adequate choices, no one 
will ever know if a choice system can work when all students are 
included. Most important, critical opportunities to improve education for 
children with disabilities are at risk of being lost.”326 Most importantly, it 
appears that the choices afforded to families of children with disabilities 
may be another illusion of choice created by the privatization of respon-
sibilities for children with disabilities. 
Conclusion 
This Article began by discussing debates about the rights of women to 
exercise rational choice in the use of prenatal genetic testing technologies 
and the responsibilities of a just society in the care and education of 
children with disabilities. The connection between the choice to use 
prenatal testing and issues of access and choice in special education is not 
readily apparent but demonstrates the complex challenges and choices 
that confront women and their partners about nurturing, rearing, and 
educating children.  
One solution to the decades-long, highly-charged political, legal, and 
cultural battles over prenatal testing and abortion has been efforts 
designed to provide pregnant women with information about the possible 
life course of a child with disabilities, including educational outcomes, 
through the Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness 
Act. Proponents of this approach have emphasized that great strides 
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have been made in improving the lives of people with disabilities through 
legislation addressing entitlement to public benefits and access to 
services and public accommodations. The access to public education for 
children with disabilities guaranteed by the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act is often cited as one of the most successful examples of 
these efforts. Yet, the success of the system in providing meaningful 
benefit to children with disabilities is being questioned by stakeholders 
across the political spectrum. As argued above, access to public  
education services is dependent on a parent’s ability to navigate the 
increasingly fragmented system of public resources or reliance on the 
private resources of family and marketplace, if available. Access to 
private resources may also require the willingness to waive meaningful 
legal protections under the IDEA and other civil rights statutes. 
The competing agendas and tensions that structure relationships  
between school districts and parents and the growing role the market 
plays in the provision of special education in American public schools 
illustrates an encroaching movement back to private, familial responsibil-
ity for children with disabilities. Parents of children with disabilities are 
increasingly limited in the choices they have for their children despite the 
political rhetoric emphasizing the right to choice for these families. The 
available evidence regarding the effects of the increasing privatization of 
responsibility for the education of children through the use of vouchers 
and charter schools indicates that children with disabilities are not well 
served by market-based reforms and are being further marginalized by 
them.  Free-market reforms may be fundamentally incompatible with the 
educational needs of children with disabilities and the overarching goals of 
promoting the dignity and inclusion of people with disabilities.  We must 
acknowledge the paradox created when there is concerted effort to 
encourage women and their partners to choose to have a child with a 
prenatally diagnosed disability while government policies emphasize 
private responsibility for the care and education of children with disabili-
ties and mandate restrictions on public expenditures for them.  
The emphasis on private responsibility and restrictions on public 
expenditures for children with disabilities are often justified by claims 
that such strictures are designed out of respect for the sanctity of family 
life and to encourage the overarching moral and legal duty of parents to 
care for their children. This is not to suggest that parents do not owe a 
duty to care for their children, disabled or not, but it is a recognition 
that society plays an essential role in caring for vulnerable citizens and 
promoting the healthy development of its citizenry. Pregnant women 
and their partners often use prenatal genetic diagnosis to achieve a sense 
of reassurance and to assert control over their reproductive choices. 
Prenatal testing, when chosen in an informed and conscious manner, 
increases reproductive choice, and it also provides hope, information, 
control, and autonomy. The practices of genetic screening and prenatal 
genetic diagnosis can be inherently pro-natal.  By supporting parental 
hopes for reasonably healthy children—not perfect offspring—the use of 
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prenatal diagnosis encourages at-risk women to undertake a pregnancy 
and to have children. Within the boundaries of the law and rational 
regulation, pregnant women and their partners should be able to make 
use of prenatal testing and related technologies, if they choose.327  
There is a continuing struggle to understand that allowing the choice 
to use prenatal genetic technologies can be incorporated into a political 
and legal agenda designed to protect the rights of children and families 
affected by disabilities and to promote the development of all children.328 
We must recognize the importance of empowering both pregnant women 
and parents of children with disabilities to exercise choice as a corner-
stone of ensuring the continuation of a just society. An obvious way to 
subjugate people is to make them feel powerless over their own lives so 
that they will not challenge the dominant paradigm. This can be done 
by constricting choices over childbearing and restricting access to the 
resources necessary to address the demands and limitations that such 
choices may create for women, families, children, and society.  
In recognition that reproductive choice in a just society encompasses 
all options, refusing prenatal testing is as accepted as choosing to 
undergo prenatal testing. More importantly, when addressing all results 
of that choice, we must avoid encouraging legal or social mandates that 
demand pregnant women and their partners reduce the likelihood that 
their future children will have a serious disability. Instead, we must 
endeavor to develop procedures for the equitable use of prenatal testing 
by all who choose to use it, on a voluntary basis—the very essence of 
choice.  
In doing so, we must also recognize that prenatal screening and  
diagnosis, even with increasingly sophisticated technologies, cannot 
eliminate all of the uncertainties about the health of a fetus. But they 
can dramatically reduce them, and that is the aim of the technologies. 
We must acknowledge that children with genetic and other disabilities 
will continue to be born even with the availability of these technologies, 
as no technology dependent on the human involvement in its application 
is infallible and the expression of many genetic conditions is multifacto-
rial in nature.  
Professor Abby Lippman, in 1994, asked a series of questions concern-
ing society’s responsibility to mothers and children in the present and 
future generations with regard to prenatal testing and disability.  “The 
question is how to provide support for women in a way that does no 
harm, that does not measure its effectiveness by the short-term profit from 
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money saved when the lives of those with present or future disabilities are 
prevented, that does not view the birth of a child with a disability as a 
technological failure.”329 These questions obviously persist and must be 
answered by considering how a just society must ensure both the right to 
choose to use prenatal technologies and the rights of children and adults 
with disabilities. 
The rights and needs of children and adults with disabilities cannot 
be subjected because of the existence of technologies that can be used to 
prevent those disabilities.  The just society does not simply provide the 
illusion of choice by ignoring all consequences of those choices, including 
the responsibility to ensure the inclusion and acceptance of those 
members with greater and more challenging needs. Such a society 
promotes meaningful inclusion by ensuring all members are educated to 
maximize their potential for independent functioning (at whatever level 
possible) while at the same time making resources to support those who 
are dependent readily available. 
Most importantly, a just society recognizes that women are capable 
of choices and entitled to support in confronting all of the potential 
consequences of those choices.  It is both logically inconsistent and 
fundamentally unfair to burden women by denying them the right to 
make decisions that result in that private responsibility.  They should 
not be punished for making demands on the state to care for and 
educate children with disabilities that result from the reproductive 
choices and uncertainties that are an inherent part of the human 
condition. 
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